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Reaching to Restructure Across
Borders (Without Over-Reaching),
Even After Brexit
by
Susan Block-Lieb*
Is there such a thing as “good” forum shopping? Courts and commentators
have begun to articulate the “virtues” of at least some forum shopping, including
forum shopping to resolve corporate insolvency or financial distress whether on a
domestic or global basis. Especially within the European Union (EU), acceptance has grown of debtors’ efforts to qualify as eligible to access the forum best
able to resolve their financial difficulties, even where the efforts involve substantial “fact shifting,” so long as these efforts occurred transparently and were
neither abusive nor in bad faith. Growing acceptance of such efforts is partly
the result of jurisprudence of the European Union Court of Justice (CJEU)
identifying a “freedom of corporate migration” as included among the EU’s foundational principles. This forum shopping debate within Europe has extended
beyond proceedings subject to the EU Insolvency Regulation to address “preinsolvency” initiatives, such as schemes of arrangement under English law, a
statutory measure through which dissenting creditors may be bound to a company’s financial restructuring by court order. Although schemes of arrangement
sit outside the EU Insolvency Reg, and only uneasily inside the scope of the
EU’s Brussels and Rome Regulations, which together govern recognition and
enforcement of judgments and choice of law clauses, corporate migrations to
enable financial restructuring through schemes of arrangement have been viewed
positively by British courts and generally have not been upset by continental
European courts.
Debate on whether and when forum shopping to facilitate corporate rescue
and restructuring should be viewed as “good” has shifted, recently, from courts
and commentators to a broader, more political setting. The diplomats responsible for re-negotiating and revising the EU Insolvency Reg, which entered into
*Cooper Family Professor in Urban Legal Issues, Fordham Law School. Many thanks to the editors
and peer reviewers at the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, to the group of scholars collected in Berlin
and Brooklyn through the help of the International Insolvency Institute, including especially Manfred Balz,
Alexander Bornemann, Ted Janger, Irit Merovach, Riz Mokal, Christoph Paulus, John Pottow and Ignacio
Tirado, to Joe Spooner, and to my Fordham colleagues Martin Gelter, Aditi Bagchi, Tom Lee and Mike
Martin.
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force late June 2017, in the main accepted the contention that recognition of
foreign schemes of arrangement ought to continue, but this resolution has in
turn been upended by the recent referendum in the United Kingdom to exit the
EU (Brexit). This article aims to do two things: First, it considers the case for
and against recognition of foreign schemes of arrangement, in the end proposing
a broader test for assessing forum shopping, one that considers the larger forum
shopping system involving, not just litigants and courts, but also legislators and,
in international settings, diplomats and global (or at least transnational)
lawmakers. Second, the article argues that a systems approach provides a superior basis for examining the merits of forum shopping given recent context.
What courts and litigants view as “good” forum shopping may well consider a
narrower set of issues than those policymakers should view as relevant. The
article claims that the Revised EU Insolvency Regulation and the eventual implications of Brexit provide one case study for application of a broad forum
shopping system analysis; more extensive analysis of this approach is left for
later research.
Is there such a thing as “good” forum shopping? All litigants make
choices in deciding where to commence a case, but venue selection decisions
that are described as “forum shopping” imply misconduct —the steering of
cases to take advantage of favorable laws, sympathetic judges, predictably
generous juries, or some combination of these.1 This rhetoric may not always
be justified, but it has been applied most frequently in the United States in
three sorts of litigation contexts: personal injury tort cases; patent litigation;
corporate reorganization, including cross-border insolvency proceedings.2 A
competing literature has begun to emerge, which points to distinct examples
of strategic litigation decisionmaking and venue selection to build a case for
1
The Supreme Court of the United States recently issued a series of cases limiting venue selection by
plaintiffs on the basis that these venue choices involved overreaching and so, implicitly, forum shopping.
See Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California, ___ U.S. ___, No. 16-466 (June 19, 2007)
(reversing finding of specific jurisdiction in tort case on grounds that “[w]hat is needed—and what is
missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”); BNSF Railway v.
Tyrell, __ U.S. __ , No. 16-405 (May 30, 2017) (concluding that 14th Amendment bars states court trials
when corporation “is not ‘at home’ in the state and the episode-in-suit occurred elsewhere.”); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group, __ U.S. __, No. 16-341 (May 22, 2017) (construing federal venue provisions to limit venue for patent infringement lawsuits); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. __ (2014) (holding
that a state court should exercise general jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations only when their “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum
State.”). See also, e.g., Tony Mauro, SCOTUS Limits Forum Shopping in Big Pharma Action, LAW.COM
(June 19, 2017), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/06/19/scotus-narrows-forum-shopping-in-bigpharma-action/ (describing this case law as cutting back on forum shopping).
2
See, e.g., Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 242 (2016) (relying on
three case studies involving personal injury tort cases, patent cases, and bankruptcy cases and arguing that,
“In non-contractual setting, forum shopping is problematic because it leads to forum selling,” by courts
with authority to decide among discretionary jurisdictional rules).
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the “virtues” in forum shopping, including cross-border forum shopping.3
The debate is not wholly academic. Although an American bankruptcy
practitioner might be surprised to hear a court recommend a debtor’s choice
of forum as involving “good forum shopping,” over the past fifteen years or
more European courts have either explicitly or tacitly approved jurisdiction
claimed over corporate debtors that had “migrated” across national borders
just prior to the insolvency proceedings or restructurings.4 The rhetoric surrounding claims of forum shopping—strategic venue selection—to assist corporate rescue has been refashioned and repurposed to fit European markets
and European law.5
This tolerance for forum shopping might jar the memories of American
bankruptcy practitioners recalling that in the early 1990s, American corporations like Eastern Airlines and Enron were scolded for filing for chapter 11 in
federal judicial districts distant from both their places of incorporation and
the locations of their corporate headquarters.6 These debtors’ choice-of-forum decisions were premised on the location of corporate assets – but, critics
claimed, were mostly motivated by the location of bankruptcy judges viewed
as pro-debtor and debtor’s counsel viewed as the best money could buy.7
Some characterized bankruptcy filings like these as evidence of forum shopping by corporations and forum selling by the bankruptcy judges receptive to
their petitions.8 To these critics, the practice of picking between legal decisionmakers felt either like a thumb on the scales of justice or, worse yet,
something akin to corruption. Critics’ concerns also extended beyond venue
selection in US chapter 11s to include forum shopping and ancillary recogni3

See Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
579 (2017) (identifying “unappreciated virtues of global forum shopping” and suggesting “balanced ways
for courts to protect them.”).
4
See, e.g., Interedil Srl v. Fallimento Interedil Srl, CJEU Case No. C-396/09 (March 10, 2011) (decision of EU Court of Justice discussing effect of transfer of place of registration prior to commencement of
insolvency proceeding governed by EU Insolvency Regulation); Re Codere Finance (UK) Ltd. [2015]
EWHC 3778 (Ch) (Dec. 17, 2015) (decision of London High Court concluding that pre-filing transfer of
place of registration and other fact shifting did not alter its conclusion that jurisdiction existed to support
scheme of arrangement under English law).
5
For discussion of the connections between regulatory competition for corporate migration and venue
competition by migrating corporations, see Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, Regulatory Competition in
European Company Law and Creditor Protection, 7 EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 417 (2006).
6
See generally CHARLES JORDAN TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 376–80 (West Pub. Corp., 4thed.
2016).
7
For the most famous of these critiques, see Lynn LoPucki, COURTING FAILURE (U. Mich. Press
2005); Lynn LoPucki & S.D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New
York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001).
8
See generally LoPucki, supra note 7 (discussing forum shopping in corporate bankruptcy); Klerman &
Reilly, supra note 2 (referring to “forum selling” by bankruptcy courts in one of several case studies in
support of their claims).
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tion of foreign insolvency proceedings.9 Many commentators defend bankruptcy venue selection in the United States,10 but claims of forum shopping
in this context persist in the literature.11 Although congressional inquiries on
whether the bankruptcy venue selection statute ought to be changed did not
result in 2005 in a new standard,12 proposals to limit bankruptcy venue
choice continue to get raised.13
This American debate on bankruptcy forum shopping, in turn, influenced
European insolvency and restructuring law and practices. By the early
2000s, European courts prepared to implement the European Union Regulation on Cross-Border Insolvency (“EU Insolvency Regulation”), which had
just entered into force.14 Perhaps cognizant of this American debate, the EU
Insolvency Regulation had been drafted to make clear that forum shopping
would not be welcomed in Europe: recitals to the regulation expressly condemned forum shopping as inconsistent with the goal of creating a single
“internal market” within the European Union;15 jurisdictional limits on the
insolvency proceedings entitled to automatic recognition under the EU Insolvency Regulation required either that the debtor’s “centre of main interests”
9

See LoPucki, supra note 7, at chs. 7 and 8.
For reviews of LoPucki, Courting Failure, see, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr. & Kenneth Ayotte, An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425–68
(2006) (reviewing Lynn LoPucki’s Courting Failure and, based on empirical evidence, questioning his contentions); see also Todd Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts? Review of
Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts by Lynn M.
LoPucki (2005), 94 GEO. L. J. 1141 (2006) (distinguishing between “good” and “bad” forum shopping
pursuant to a structural analysis of forum shopping competition that considers judges’ incentives to innovate and achieve efficient results or to engage rent-seeking to redistribute wealth). For earlier literature
inconsistent with LoPucki’s claims, see, e.g., Barry E. Adler & Henry N. Butler, On the “Delawarization of
Bankruptcy” Debate, 52 EMORY L. J. 1309 (2003); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy
Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1 (1998); David A. Skeel, Jr., What’s So Bad About
Delaware?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 309 (2001); Robert Rasmussen & R.S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting
Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357 (2000).
11
See, e.g., Klerman & Reilly, supra note 2.
12
Congressional proposals to limit the federal statute setting venue in bankruptcy cases commenced in
the United States (28 U.S.C. § 1411) were introduced in 2005 and hearings were subsequently held. See
Jeffrey Morris, American Bankruptcy Institute Legislative Update, S.314 – Fairness in Bankruptcy Litigation Act of 2005: Restricting Venue Choice for Corporate Debtors (Mar. 1, 2005), https://www.abi.org/
abi-journal/legislative-update-s-314-fairness-in-bankruptcy-litigation-act-of-2005-restricting-venue. In the
end, these proposals were not included in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005.
13
For more recent debate on the need to circumvent bankruptcy forum shopping, see Robert J. Gayda,
The Bankruptcy Venue Debate: A Never Ending Story, LAW360 (July 14, 2015), https://www.law360
.com/articles/676417/the-bankruptcy-venue-debate-a-never-ending-story; Susan Mathews, Corporate
Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: The Case for Venue Reform, ABFJOURNAL (Oct. 2014), http://www.abfjournal
.com/articles/corporate-chapter-11-bankruptcies-the-case-for-venue-reform/.
14
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings (May 29, 2000) [hereinafter the
original “EU Insolvency Reg.”].
15
See EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 14, at Rec. 4 (“It is necessary for the proper functioning of the
internal market to avoid . . . forum shopping.”).
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(referred to as the debtor’s COMI) was located in the member state in which
proceedings were opened or, in the case of a secondary proceeding, that there
was at least an establishment in the opening state.16 These jurisdictional
limits looked to prevent the forum shopping that drafters otherwise feared.
Despite these jurisdictional limits, British courts relied on English law to
open administration proceedings,17 sometimes coupled with company voluntary arrangements (CVAs),18 for companies like Schefenacker,19 Deutche
Nickel20 and Hellas Wind21 and others,22 although these companies within
months or weeks before the applications were filed had engaged in elaborate
corporate transactions intended to “move” from an earlier place of registration – whether Germany or Lichtenstein or elsewhere – and qualify to file
under British insolvency law.23 Administrations and “voluntary arrangements
under insolvency legislation” sit within the scope of the EU Insolvency Regulation and so are limited to companies with either a COMI or establishment
in the UK; but with these cases, the grounds for such jurisdiction had been
created only shortly before the filing. Complaints by creditors from the company’s place of origin arose in these local settings after British court orders
opening these proceedings had become final and, thus, too distant and too late
for consideration.24
16

EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 14, at Art. 3. While the COMI standard is not explicitly defined in
the EU Insolvency Reg., a corporation is presumed to have its center of main interests in the state of its
place of registration. For decisions from the EU Court of Justice expanding on this standard, see Interedil
Srl v. Fallimento Interedil Srl, CJEU Case No. C-396/09 (March 10, 2011); Eurofood Ifsc, CJEU Case
No. C-341/04 (Sept. 27, 2005). Commentary on the EU Insolvency Regulation generally and its primary
jurisdictional hook, the “centre of main interests,” more specifically, is vast. For examples of this commentary, see generally ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, at 719–47 (4th ed. 2011);
GABRIEL MOSS, IAN F. FLETCHER & STUART ISAACS, EU REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
(3d ed. 2016); REINHARD BORK & KRISTEN VAN ZWIETEN, COMMENTARY ON THE EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY REGULATION (3d ed., 2016).
17
For a brief description of administration proceeding under English law, see Goode, supra note 16, at
33–35.
18
For a brief description of “company voluntary arrangements,” often referred to as “CVAs,” see
Goode, supra note 16, at 41.
19
See generally Wolf-Georg Ringe, Strategic Insolvency Migration and Community Law in CURRENT
ISSUES IN EUROPEAN FINANCIAL AND INSOLVENCY LAW, at 75–77 (Wolf-Georg Ringe et al. eds., 2009)
[hereinafter “Ringe, Strategic Insolvency”]; Reinhard Bork, Rescuing Companies in England and Germany,
OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, at ¶ 1.07 (July 10, 2012).
20
See, e.g., Ringe, Strategic Insolvency, supra note 19, at 77.
21
Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) IISCA [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch) [2010] BCC 295.
See also, e.g., Ringe, Strategic Insolvency, supra note 19, at 78–79.
22
See, e.g., Re European Directories v (DH6) BV [2010] EWHC 3472 (Ch); Gallery Capital SA, Re,
2010 WL 4777509 (Ch) (21 Apr. 2010).
23
In each of these instances, the companies accomplished, in practical effect, a cross-border merger with
a newly created English entity, shifting their place of registration, assets and liabilities on the eve of their
insolvency filings, and satisfying to the satisfaction of the British courts the need to establish the COMI of
these companies before commencing English insolvency proceedings. See generally id.
24
But see Hans Brochier Holdings Ltd. v. Exner [2006] EWHC 2594, [2007] BCC 127, [2007] NZI
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Complaints of forum shopping were viewed as out of step with an emerging European jurisprudence out of the European Union Court of Justice
(CJEU), which had identified the “freedom of migration” as among the foundational principles of the European Union, as well as insolvency scholarship
built on the shoulders of this corporate law doctrine.25 Relying on this case
law, courts and commentators grew increasingly open to the idea of shopping
among fora, at least where corporate debtors were not involved in fraudulent
or abusive activity.26
CJEU case law makes clear that a corporation’s lack of connection with
its place of registration is not itself evidence of fraudulent bad faith or
abuse,27 but mostly leaves the question of misconduct to a case-by-case assessment.28 This doctrine and scholarship struggles to distinguish between
good and bad forum shopping, but does not waiver in the certainty that abusive conduct can be identified and abusive cases prohibited.29 Some emphasize the transparency of corporate actions (or lack thereof) as critically
important to a finding of lack of abuse,30 especially since the CJEU emphasized in Eurofood that the facts pertinent to a determination of a debtor’s
187 (involving failed attempt at corporate migration by a German construction company seeking to commence English administration proceedings).
25
See CJEU No. C-21297/97 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstryrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459
[hereinafter “Centros”]; CJEU No. C-208/00 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Co. Baummanagement GmbH [2002] ECR 1-9919; CJEU No. C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. [2003] ECR 1-10155; Kornhaas v. Dithmar, CJEU Case No. C-5941/14
[2016] [hereinafter “Kornhaas”]. For discussion of the European “freedom of migration” and its interaction with cross-border insolvency forum shopping within the EU, see generally Ringe, Strategic Migration,
supra note 19; Horst Eidenmüller, Free Choice in International Company Insolvency Law in Europe, 6
EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 423 (2005) [hereinafter “Eidenmüller, Free Choice”]; Enriques & Gelter, Regulatory Competition in European Company Law and Creditor Protection, 7 EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 417
(2006).
26
See, e.g, Centros, supra note 25; see also Horst Eidenmüller, Abuse of Law in the Context of European
Insovency Law, 6 EURO. COM. FIN. L. REV. 1 (2009) [hereinafter “Eidenmüller, Abuse of Law”]; Irit
Mevorach, Forum Shopping in Times of Crisis: A Directors’ Duties Perspective, 4 EURO. C. FIN. REV. 523
(2013); Ringe, Strategic Migration, supra note 20.

R
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28

R

See Centros, supra note 25, at ¶ 1.
See, e.g., Eidenmüller, Abuse of Law, supra note 25, at 2; Enriques & Gelter, supra note 5, at 435–36.

29

See, e.g., John Armour, Abuse of European Insolvency Law? A Discussion, in PROHIBITIONS OF ABUSE
OF LAW: A NEW GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EU LAW? (R. de la Feria & S. Vogenauer eds. 2011); Eidenmüller, Abuse of Law, supra note 26; Ringe, Strategic Migration, supra note 19; Adrian Walters & Anton
Smith, Bankruptcy Tourism under the EC Regulation on insolvency proceedings: a view from England and
Wales, 10.1002/iir.187, at 19(3) 181, 39 (Oct. 18, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1630890.
30
See, e.g., Eidenmüller, Free Choice, supra note 24, at 429 (contending that “the most important aspect” of a test of “good” forum shopping “is the east ascertainability and predictability of [insolvency] rules
[to the debtor’s creditors] when they grant credit.”); Eidenmüller, Abuse of Law, supra note 25, at 4–5
(discussing influence of Eurofood); Peter Mankowski, The European World of Insolvency Tourism: Renewed, But Still Brave?, 64 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 95–114 (2017) (“The creditors’ legitimate expectations
deserve, if not outrightly demand, protection against manipulation.”).
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COMI should be “readily ascertainable” to its creditors.31 Some contend that
what is most important is whether creditors consented to the move, whether
the move benefitted creditors by maximizing the debtor’s net assets and, thus,
whether the motives for the movement should be described not as gamesmanship or abuse but as a matter of socially beneficial “free choice.”32 Some argue
that the timing of a corporation’s migration from its original place of registration should not alone be viewed as an indication of “bad faith” or “bad forum
shopping.”33 If corporate migrations when a company is solvent are among
the “four freedoms,” the argument runs, corporate migrations on the eve of an
insolvency filing should get protected as well, at least in the absence of additional evidence of misconduct.34
Recently, the forum shopping debate within Europe has extended beyond
proceedings subject to the EU Insolvency Regulation to address “pre-insolvency” initiatives, especially schemes of arrangement under English law, a
statutory measure through which dissenting creditors may be bound to a
company’s financial restructuring.35 English schemes of arrangement, unique
among EU member states, allow financially distressed companies to work out
problematic bank or bond debt without the need for commencing a costly and
time-consuming insolvency proceeding.36 The complication here is that these
pre-insolvency restructurings sit outside the EU Insolvency Reg,37 which
means both that its jurisdictional limits are inapplicable and alternative
grounds for automatic recognition and enforcement of these arrangements are
a matter of dispute.38 Corporate migrations to enable financial restructuring
have been viewed positively by British courts, notwithstanding last minute
changes in corporate form, and generally have not been upset by continental
European courts.39 Questions of pre-insolvency forum shopping have been
31
These commentators refer to CJEU’s emphasis in Eurofood to Rec. 13 in the EU Insolvency Reg.
Eurofood, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 32–33 (noting that COMI standard “should correspond to the place where
the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by
third parties.”).
32
Eidenmüller, Free Choice, supra note 24, at 428–29.
33
See, e.g., Ringe, Strategic Manipulation, supra note 19, at 92 (arguing that “a creditor is never able to
predict which insolvency law his claim will be subject to – as long as the internal market consists of
different substantive insolvency regimes.”); Mevorach, Directors’ Duties Perspective, supra note 26, at
539–40 (contending that a test of the reasonableness of directors’ migratory decisionmaking should govern
assessments of the beneficial effects of the COMI-shift rather than the timing or degree of success of the
migration).
34
See generally Eidenmüller, Free Choice, supra note 24; Enriques & Gelter, supra note 5.
35
See, e.g., Jennifer Payne, Cross-Border Schemes of Arrangement and Forum Shopping, 14 EURO. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 563 (2013) [hereinafter “Payne, Cross-Border Schemes”]. See also text associated with infra
notes 61–127
36
See GOODE, supra note 16, at 38–43.
37
EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 14.
38
See, e.g., Payne, Cross-Border Schemes, supra note 35.
39
See Ruud Hermanns, Consequences of the German Equitable Life - Decision for the Use of English
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largely pushed aside by the courts.40
For example, a London High Court recently was asked to sanction a
scheme of arrangement41 involving an English subsidiary of a Spanish corporation, Codere SA, engaged in gaming services throughout Spain, Italy, and
Latin America.42 Although the financial difficulties of the Codere group
were widely known years before its scheme of arrangement was proposed,
the company viewed insolvency proceedings, whether initiated in Spain or
elsewhere, as potentially risking its all-important gaming licenses. With the
knowledge and encouragement of its creditors, Codere looked to avoid this
result through the proposed scheme.43
Months before convening a meeting of creditors for their consideration
and approval of a scheme of arrangement, the company had formed Codere
Finance (UK) Ltd. and caused the newly minted subsidiary to assume most of
the debt of the Codere group (initially borrowed by Codere Finance (Luxembourg) SA).44 The new subsidiary’s connections to the UK were otherwise
limited: the assumed debt was governed by New York law, guaranteed by
Codere SA and other group companies, and subject to an English law intercreditor agreement originally made in 2005.45 At the meeting called to consider the proposed scheme of arrangement, creditors were informed that their
approval of the proposal would result in the eventual repayment of 47 percent of the outstanding indebtedness owed to them and that their rejection of
the scheme would likely be followed by a Spanish insolvency proceeding in
which nearly all value would be lost. Not surprisingly, creditors overwhelmingly favored the restructuring, with claims totaling more than 98 percent of
the value of the outstanding indebtedness voting in favor of the scheme.
Based on these facts, the London High Court approved the Codere
scheme of arrangement, acknowledging that the financing subsidiary in that
case may have engaged in forum shopping by choosing to reorganize its corpoSchemes of Arrangement in Cross-border Reorganizations, INSOL WORLD 35 (Winter 2013), http://www
.debrauw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Insol-World-Consequences-of-the-German-Equitable-Life
.pdf.
40
See, e.g., Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] 1104 (Ch.); [2012] BCC 459; Re Primacom Holding GmbH
v. Credit Agricole [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch) (Dec. 20, 2011); Re Van Gansewinkel Group [2015]
EWHC 2151 (Ch); Re Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch), [2014] All ER (D)
221 (Nov); Re DTEK Finance B.V. [2015] EWHC 1164 (Ch).
41
For a description of the law and practices surrounding schemes of arrangement under English law,
see, e.g., JENNIFER PAYNE, SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION, at 1
(Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 2014).
42
Re Codere Finance (UK) Ltd. [2015] EWHC 3778 (Ch).
43
Id. at 5.
44
Id. at 6 (“The accession of the company as a co-obligor in relation to the notes was undertaken
pursuant to an instruction from Codere SA as the company’s sole shareholder and with the agreement of
more than 97 percent of the noteholders.”).
45
Id. at 3.
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rate structure and debt holdings in an effort to satisfy the requirements of
British law.46 The forum shopping should be forgiven in this case, said the
court, because it was “good forum shopping.”47 It was good forum shopping,
said the court, because although Codere intentionally sought to avoid Spanish
insolvency law, it did not do so in bad faith. The company had worked in
tandem with its creditors, the overwhelming majority of which had approved
both the scheme of arrangement and the corporate migration and document
modification that had preceded the request to convene creditors. Creditors
had agreed to the corporate migration and the scheme of arrangement because
they were substantially better off as a financial matter. Thus, while Codere
might have looked to avoid Spanish insolvency proceedings, it had not been
looking to evade repayment of creditors with its foreign scheme of arrangement; instead, it looked to maximize their repayment through the scheme.
Codere was not a one-off case involving a so-called “foreign scheme of
arrangement.”48 Over the past several years, British courts have approved a
handful of schemes of arrangement that involved shifts in the company’s head
office functions on the eve of the application to convene the required meeting
of creditors,49 changes in debt instruments regarding the governing law,50 and
the creation of new entities and the assumption of debts governed by English
law.51
Commentators have agreed with the courts’ assessments that Codere and
similar foreign schemes involving corporate migrations should be tolerated as
46

Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No. 1 Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2006, at
Part 26 [hereinafter “Companies Act 2006”].
47
Codere, supra note 42, at 18. See also Bookman, supra note 3; Note: Forum Shopping Reconsidered,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1677 (1990).
48
The phrase was not used by the court in Codere, but is widely understood to pertain to a scheme of
arrangement under English and Welsh law that involves a company registered outside England and Wales
(indeed, the UK), especially one with its center of main interests outside the UK and no establishment in
the UK. See, e.g., PHILIP R. WOOD, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, at 20-016
(Sweet & Maxwell eds. 2007). Codere arguably was not a “foreign scheme of arrangement” because, as a
consequence of the transactions that occurred before the request to call a meeting of creditors, Codere
(UK) Ltd. was an English company.
49
See, e.g., Re Magyar Telecom B.V. [2013] EWHC 3800 (Ch); but see Re Indah Kiat International
Finance Company BV [2016] EWHC 246 (raising procedural and evidentiary concerns to proposed
scheme of arrangement, but not to shift of company’s headquarters on eve of convening of creditors’
meeting). A company’s shift of its headquarters or head office functions is directed at accomplishing a shift
in its “centre of main interests” or COMI, the jurisdictional standard set out in the original EU Insolvency
Reg and UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. See, e.g., BO XIE, COMPARATIVE INSOLVENCY LAW: THE PRE-PAK APPROACH IN CORPORATE RESCUE, at chapter 8 (Elgar Publ. 2016). . Because the EU Insolvency Reg. does not cover schemes of arrangement, COMI shifting is not directed at
satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of that Reg. EU Insolvency Reg, supra note 14, Art. 3(1). If a
company shifts its COMI before approval of a scheme is sought, it often is with an eye toward subsequent
recognition of the scheme under US chapter 15. See, e.g., Codere, supra note 42.
50
See. e.g., Re Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch.).
51
See, e.g., Re AI Scheme Limited [2015] EWHC 1233 (Ch.); Codere, supra note 42.
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“good” pre-insolvency forum shopping.52 Emphasis is placed on the consensus
of the restructuring companies’ creditors and the obvious economic benefits
of the English scheme as compared to a Spanish insolvency proceeding.53 But
this focus on creditors’ consent to a foreign scheme of arrangement could
suggest that every scheme that meets the statutory threshold should be
viewed as involving “good” forum shopping, regardless of the corporate machinations that preceded the scheme, since a scheme is only sanctioned by the
court if it is approved by more than 75 percent of the affected creditors or
other stakeholders with claims or interests. Focus on economic benefits with
reference to facts introduced in an often-uncontroverted court hearing could
also lead to an overstatement of the circumstances in which foreign schemes
of arrangement ought to get affirmed as exercises in good forum shopping
since a super-majority of creditors is unlikely to vote in favor of a proposed
scheme except in their self-interest.
A focus on the benefits of a foreign scheme of arrangement to the company and its affected creditors may be the best approach for assessing
whether a court should enter a scheme order, but this litigation oriented
focus on the micro-incentives of the company and its super-majority of creditors may overstate the beneficial attributes of a foreign scheme of arrangement. It may fail to consider the significance of the subsequent success or
failure of the scheme, as well as ignore the wider social, political and economic consequences relevant to the question of whether schemes of arrangement ought to be tolerated (and thus enforced) outside the UK. Empirical
evidence on the European-wide effects of foreign schemes of arrangement is
also missing and should be developed before settling on the beneficial attributes of this corporate migration.54
This article aims to do two things: First, it proposes a broader test for
assessing insolvency and pre-insolvency forum shopping, one that views questions surrounding venue selection as more than legal questions. The article
focuses predominantly on the forum shopping debate surrounding foreign
schemes of arrangement, since the case law in this context is more recent and
the literature less developed. It considers the debate from the perspective of
a larger forum shopping system involving, not just litigants and courts, but
also legislators and, in international settings, diplomats and global (or at least
transnational) lawmakers.55 Second, it argues that this systems approach pro52

See, e.g., Payne, Cross-Border Schemes, supra note 35.
Id.
54
It is also absent from the discussion of forum shopping for insolvency proceedings within Europe.
See Eidenmuller, Abuse of Law, supra note 26, at 6.
55
See generally Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L. REV. 53, 68 (1991) (defining “forum
shopping systems” and warning against universal adherence to the doctrine of comity and other forum
shopping systems as leading potentially “to problems of global lawlessness, as court after court denies
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vides a superior basis for examining the merits of such forum shopping, particularly given recent context: Important revisions to the EU Insolvency Reg,56
intending to address the problems of insolvency and pre-insolvency forum
shopping, got resolved just as the United Kingdom voted on a referendum to
exit from the European Union; Brexit is likely to unsettle this regulatory
resolution, and will affect more than the law governing cross-border
restructuring.57
A focus on forum shopping that looks only at the decisions that litigants
make and courts mediate would miss larger issues of political economy. But
the persistence of a forum shopping system, even a “good” one, is fragile. Not
only is it is difficult to distinguish between good and bad jurisdictional encouragements of this sort, but also the continuing benefits of such a system
are subject to contestation. Forum shopping systems may look to create a
jurisdictional monopoly, and yet the political and economic benefits of this
sort of confluence of power invite constant re-examination and occasional
trust busting. Current events have created just such a moment for reconsideration and recalibration of the line between good and bad foreign schemes of
arrangement and the system in place for their enforcement.
In considering the legal, political, and economic issues involved in the
recognition of schemes of arrangement across Europe post-Brexit, this article
proceeds as follows: Part I discusses current British case law on foreign
schemes of arrangement, including questions of whether the orders entered
by British courts are subject to recognition and enforcement under European
law as it now (fragilely) stands. Part II reflects on whether recent revisions
access or recovery to the plaintiff seeking to enforce legal norms under the law of some forum.”); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011) (refuting claim
of transnational litigation explosion in US courts, and related forum shopping system, as an empirical
matter). Weinberg and Whytock both define a forum shopping system as involving the interactions of
litigants, court and possibly also legislatures such that weak jurisdictional limitations enable unfettered
choices among substantive legal options. For a more detailed discussion of this literature on forum shopping systems, see infra, text accompanying notes 133–144, infra. For another perspective on “global forum
shopping,” see Bookman, supra note 3.
56
Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council on insolvency proceedings (recast)
No. 2015/848 (May 20, 2015) [hereinafter the “Recast EU Insolvency Regulation” or “Recast Reg”]. The
Recast EU Insolvency Regulation entered into effect on June 30, 2017. See also Recast EU Reg., supra, at
Art. 92.
57
“Brexit” refers to a recent referendum in the United Kingdom to exit the European Union. Under
Art. 50 of the Treaty on Lisbon, exit from the European Union triggers a two-year period of negotiation
between the exiting member state and the remaining EU member states on the terms of such a withdrawal. Although in theory the UK’s exit from the EU has not explicitly triggered leaving the European
Economic Area (EEA), which might if it remained might still bind it to directives and not regulations, the
notion that the UK might remain in the EEA but not the EU has been questioned as politically unlikely
(although not economically undesirable) by commentators. See, e.g., Andrew Dickinson, Close the Door on
Your Way Out: A Bystander’s View of Brexit (Oxford Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 39/2017) (March
1, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2964967.
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to the EU Insolvency Regulation speak to this issue: specifically, whether
schemes of arrangement fall within the scope of the recast EU Reg and, if not,
how the recast Insolvency Reg might implicate restructuring practices in the
UK and EU going forward.58 Part II also discusses a new draft EU Directive
on a Preventive Restructuring Framework.59 Part III speculates on how
Brexit might affect European recognition and enforcement of schemes of arrangement ordered by British courts. Part IV turns from the legal issues surrounding the enforcement of foreign schemes of arrangement to the political
economy in which this law is embedded. The importance of the recognition
of schemes of arrangement to global financial markets is emphasized. As the
UK leaves the EU, London’s near monopoly in financial services markets,
including the professional services that facilitate European and global trade in
these financial services, may be contested.60
I. SCHEMES AND FOREIGN SCHEMES
A. SCHEMES

OF

ARRANGEMENT

While initially created with the Companies Act of 1862,61 the current
provisions are found in Part 26 of the Companies Act of 2006.62 Schemes are
widely flexible and allow for the restructuring of a company’s capital under
English law. Since the Companies Act does not limit its purposes, “in theory,
a scheme could be a compromise or arrangement between a company and its
creditors or members about anything that they can properly agree amongst
themselves.”63 Often enough, schemes of arrangement bind dissenting creditors to a financial restructuring intended to avoid a bankruptcy or insolvency
proceeding. But they might be relied on to bind dissenting creditors in some
other context, or even to bind dissenting equity interests when the arrangement involve shares of stock not debt.
Schemes of arrangement to restructure a company’s financial arrangements are distinct from both purely contractual workouts, on one hand, and
58

See Recast EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 56.
Proposal for Directive 2016/723, of the European Parliament and of the Council on Preventive
Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Restructuring,
Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and Amending Directive 2012/30/EU, 2016 O.J. (L 141) 19 [hereinafter “proposed Restructuring Directive”].
60
Although international PIL treaties have long been touted as apolitical, history has shown that PIL
negotiations rarely avoid either politics or consideration of issues of substance. See Harold C. Gutteridge,
Seventeenth Lecture of the David Murray Foundation at the University of Glasgow: The Codification of
Private International Law (May 11, 1950); HAROLD C. GUTTERIDGE, THE CODIFICATION OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1951) (discussing pros and cons of PIL conventions versus codification efforts
aimed at unifying private laws).
61
Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c.89), at § 126 [hereinafter “Companies Act 1862”].
62
Companies Act 2006, at § 895.
63
See PAYNE, supra note 41.
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reorganization proceedings, on the other.64 They differ from purely contractual restructuring agreements, in that while these sorts of contracts are only
binding on consenting parties, court orders sanctioning a scheme bind dissenters, as well. Alternatively, schemes of arrangement might occur in the context of an insolvency proceeding, but should not be confused with the
proceedings themselves. Schemes differ from an administration’s or company’s voluntary arrangements under English law, and what in the US is
referred to as a reorganization proceeding (or chapter 11 case). The procedures associated with a scheme of arrangement are far less complicated and
involve far less court involvement than any of these other judicial
proceedings.65
The binding of dissenters through a scheme of arrangement depends on a
showing that the meeting of creditors followed procedural requirements set
out in the Act, and that the class of affected creditors agreed by more than
fifty percent in number and seventy-five percent in value of the voting claims
or interests.66 Judicial involvement in a scheme of arrangement is minimal
but court orders are required both to call a meeting of creditors and to sanction any scheme of arrangement approved by the requisite super-majority.
The potential breadth of arrangements is subject to few limits. One of
these is jurisdictional; three others are more jurisprudential in origin. Court
approval on each of these issues is required for a scheme to bind dissenting
creditors.
1. Jurisdictional Limits.
Section 895 of the Companies Act 2006 provides only that the arrangement in a scheme should be proposed between “a company” and its creditors
or members, and defines “a company” as referring to “any company liable to
be wound up under the Insolvency Act of 1986.”67 The 1986 Insolvency
Act broadly enables the winding up of companies that are solvent or insolvent, registered or unregistered.68 Because British courts have long held that
the term “unregistered companies” includes foreign companies, foreign
schemes of arrangement are nothing new.69
Equating “a company” subject to a scheme with reference to a company
“liable to be wound up” under the Insolvency Act of 1986 might have been
64

See GOODE, supra note 16, at 40–45.
For a general discussion of the relationship between informal and formal insolvency procedures and
restructuring arrangements, see Jose Garrido, Out-of-Court Debt Restructuring, World Bank Study,
WORLD BANK (2012).
66
See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 16, at 40–45.
67
Companies Act 2006, at § 895.
68
Insolvency Act 1986 (1986 c. 45), at § 221 [hereinafter “Insolvency Act 1986”].
69
See, e.g., Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetchesky) v. Kindersley [1951] Ch. 112 [hereinafter “Kindersley”].
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read narrowly by British courts in the wake of jurisdictional limits set out in
the EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings.70 The EU Insolvency Regulation requires European-wide recognition of an order commencing a winding
up proceeding in the UK.71 Although the Insolvency Act of 1986 would
enable the winding up of any European registered companies, since foreign
companies are viewed as “unregistered companies” for this purpose,72 by its
terms, the EU Insolvency Reg applies only to those EU-registered companies
that have either a center of main interests or establishment in the UK.73
Winding up proceedings involving insolvent foreign companies are only subject to recognition under the EU Insolvency Reg if the company has a COMI
or establishment in the UK.74 In this way, the Reg is said to limit the jurisdiction of British courts’ exercise of jurisdiction under the Insolvency Act.
British courts have not imported the jurisdictional limits under the EU
Reg as imposing parallel limits on the reach of their jurisdiction to sanction
foreign schemes of arrangement under the 2006 Companies Act, however.75
The EU Reg covers only “insolvency proceedings.”76 Several different sorts
of insolvency and winding-up proceedings under British law are explicitly
included in Annex A to the EU Insolvency Regulation, but schemes of arrangement are not included in Annex A. One explanation for their absence
from Annex A is that the Companies Act broadly enables schemes of arrangement, regardless of whether the company is solvent or insolvent and
without regard to whether or where it is registered; the definition of “insolvency proceedings” covered by the EU Reg is far narrower.77 Another is
that British diplomats explicitly negotiated this absence.78
Courts, thus, construe the Companies Act requirement that a scheme of
arrangement pertain to a “company liable to be wound up under the Insolvency Act of 1986” as a hypothetical test: because a solvent foreign unregistered company might get wound up under Insolvency Act, and because the
winding up of such a foreign company would sit outside the EU Insolvency
Reg, then the court has jurisdiction under the 2006 Companies Act to sanc70

See EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 14, at Art. 3.
Id. at Annex A.
72
Insolvency Act 1986, at § 221.
73
See EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 14, at Art. 3.
74
Id.
75
See Kindersley, supra note 69.
76
EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 14, at Arts. 3(1) & 2(a).
77
Horst Eidenmüller, What Is an Insolvency Proceeding?, 92:1 Am. Bank. L.J. , (2018).
78
Richard Baines & Yana Davies, Legal Briefing, The EC Commission’s Proposal for Changes to the EC
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, THE IN-HOUSE LAWYER (July 1, 2013), http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/legal-briefing/the-ec-commissions-proposal-for-changes-to-the-ec-regulation-on-insolvency-proceedings/ (noting that Annex A’s failure to include schemes of arrangements “was a deliberate
omission on the part of the UK, as schemes can be used for reorganisation purposes generally and are not
regarded as purely an insolvency procedure.”).
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tion its scheme of arrangement. In making this assessment, courts do not
consider whether the choice to attempt a creditor-approved scheme of arrangement is a decision not to wind up or otherwise liquidate under applicable law and, thus, avoid addressing whether, if the company sought to wind
up under English law it would be able to do so consistent with the EU
Insolvency Regulation. At least one commentator notes this plausible, alternative construction of section 895’s cross-reference to the Insolvency Act of
1986 and on this ground cautions that the line of reasoning that foreign
schemes of arrangement are permissible is not entirely free from doubt.79
Nonetheless, British courts uniformly construe the jurisdictional provisions in
section 895 as providing little to no limit on their authority to sanction a
foreign scheme of arrangement.80
2. Jurisprudential Limits.
Although section 895 of the Companies Act 2006 might, in theory, be
read to permit any foreign company to propose a scheme of arrangement,
British courts have identified additional limits on when they will exercise
their discretion to permit schemes involving foreign companies.81 Courts
specify that they will decline to exercise their broad jurisdiction over a foreign company unless it is also shown that: (i) there is a “sufficient connection”
between the foreign company and England or Wales, “which may, but does
not necessarily have to, consist of assets within the jurisdiction;” (ii) there is a
“reasonable possibility” of “benefit” to those requesting the order approving
the scheme of arrangement; and (iii) “one or more persons interested in the
distribution of assets of the company must be persons over whom the court
can exercise a jurisdiction.”82
Notwithstanding these judge-made limits on foreign schemes, over the
past several years, British courts have sanctioned numerous schemes involving foreign companies. Many of the schemes involved companies registered
and with a center of main interests elsewhere in Europe, and without either
an establishment or much in the way of assets in the UK.83 Courts found
79

Payne, supra note 35, at 577.
Id.
81
See Re Drax Holdings Ltd [2003] EWHC 2743 (Ch.) (identifying three-factor test as indicative of a
court’s exercise of discretion rather than limits on its jurisdiction).
82
See, e.g., Re Real Estate Development Co. [1991] BCLC 210, at 217 (involving winding up of foreign
company); Re Drax Holdings Ltd [2003] EWHC 2743 (Ch.) (debt restructuring); [2004] 1 WLR 1049;
Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] 1104 (Ch.); [2012] BCC 459, at 21 (debt restructuring).
83
See, e.g., Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] 1104 (Ch.); [2012] BCC 459 (solvent German COMI-ed
company with no establishment in UK); Re Primacom Holding GmbH v. Credit Agricole [2011] EWHC
3746 (Ch.) (Dec. 20, 2011); Primacom Holding GmbH v. Credit Agricole [2012] EWHC 164 (Ch.) (Jan.
20, 2012) (solvent German COMI-ed company with no establishment in UK); Re Van Gansewinkel
Group [2015] EWHC 2151 (Ch.) (Belgium and Dutch corporations without COMI, establishment or
assets in UK); Re Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch.), [2014] All ER (D) 221
80
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“sufficient connections” in less tangible factors, and require proof only of the
“possibility” of benefit such that this exercise of jurisdiction effectively extends to at least several persons.
a. Sufficiency of connections.
The sufficiency of the connections between the companies seeking court
authorization of its scheme of arrangement and England or Wales rarely requires the presence of assets within this jurisdiction. Early cases, such as that
involving the German lens manufacturer, Rodenstock, emphasized the domicile of the foreign companies’ creditors and the fact that loan or other financial documents between the company and its creditors chose to be governed
by English law and subject to English jurisdiction.84 But later cases, such as
that involving the German cable company, Primacom Holding GmbH, found
sufficient connections based solely on English choice of law and choice of
court provisions, given that nearly all of its creditors were found to have
domiciles outside the UK.85
The presence of English choice of law clauses has, of late, been found
sufficient to satisfy the jurisprudential requirement of “connections” between
the foreign company and England.86 This contractual connection is so
strongly presumed that courts have not hesitated to approve a scheme of
arrangement proposed by a company whose non-English choice of law clause
was amended by a vote of the majority of its creditors to specify that English
law governed their financial transactions.87
Where English law has not been chosen to govern the debt instrument
that forms the subject of the scheme of arrangement, British courts might find
a sufficiency of connections in other factors, even in the absence of a contractual amendment. Codere (UK) Finance Ltd, mentioned above, was held to
possess sufficient contacts as a result of its (recently acquired) UK registration and UK COMI.88 Although the debt transferred to it was subject to a
US choice of law clause, English law governed a related inter-company guar(Nov. 2014) (German COMI-ed company with no establishment in UK); DTEK Finance B.V., Re [2015]
EWHC 1164 (Ch.) (Dutch COMI-ed group). But see Re La Seda de Barcelona SA [2010] EWHC 1364
(Ch.) (Spanish COMI-ed company with UK establishment); Codere, supra note 42 (debt transferred to
newly created UK registered subsidiary within months before scheme). See also Indah Kiat International
Finance Company BV [2016] EWHC 246 (Ch.) (application by solvent Dutch company with registered
branch in UK denied on procedural grounds).
84
Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] 1104 (Ch.); [2012] BCC 459.
85
See Re Primacom Holding GmbH v. Credit Agricole [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch.) (Dec. 20, 2011);
Primacom Holding GmbH v. Credit Agricole [2012] EWHC 164 (Ch.) (Jan. 20, 2012).
86
See, e.g., La Seda [2010]; Metrovacesa SA [2011]; Re Rodenstock [2011]; Re PrimaCom [2012];
Cortefiel SA [2012]; Re NEF Telecom Co BV [2012]; Global Investment House [2012]; Monier [2013];
van Gansewinkel Group [2015].
87
See APCOA Group [2015]; see also DTEK Bv [2015].
88
Codere, supra note 42.
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antee agreement.89
British courts have not viewed as problematic the fact that the “connections” to England and Wales had been constructed within months before the
request for assistance in putting together a scheme of arrangement. In
Codere, the company’s COMI shifted before seeking approval of the scheme;
in Indah Kiat, a Dutch registered company gave notice of its intent to shift its
COMI to England; in APCOA Group, a German group of companies shifted
neither its COMI nor its establishment but only the governing choice of law
clause in its financial documentation.90
b. Possibility of benefits.
If British courts are sanctioning schemes proposed by companies that are
not British companies or really in any sense located in Britain, so too is the
location of the companies’ creditors viewed as mostly irrelevant. Rarely do
courts require a showing that the creditors subject to the scheme reside or
are domiciled in the UK. Although in Rodenstock GmbH the court sanctioned a German registered company’s scheme of arrangement in part because
more than a majority of its creditors were located in the UK (creditors representing 56.5 % in value of debt voting in favor of the scheme resided in UK),
convincing it that there was a “reasonable possibility of benefit” for the
scheme on this basis,91 courts subsequently relaxed this requirement. In
Primacom Holding GmbH, the court approved a scheme proposed by a German registered company, even thought its creditors were mostly domiciled
outside the UK.92 With Primacom Holding the court found that the presence
of several creditors in the UK was held open sufficient “possibility of benefit,” especially given that the affected debt was contractually governed by
English law.
c. Effectiveness of the Foreign Scheme.
While neither the “connections” nor the “benefits” tests have much teeth
left to them, the third jurisprudential limit requiring a showing that the
court’s exercise of jurisdiction extends to at least several persons, which I’ll
call the “effectiveness” test,” has caused British courts to struggle a little more
in their sanctioning of foreign schemes of arrangement. Where the creditors
are mostly residents of the UK, the scheme order is effective as against them.
But with foreign schemes of arrangement, the company’s creditors may reside
in the EU, the United States, or elsewhere.
When US creditors are involved, chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code
89

Id.
Codere supra note 42; APCOA Group, supra note 50; Indah Kiat, supra note 49.
91
Rodenstock GmbH, supra note 83 (including English choice of law and choice of court provisions in
the affected financial contracts).
92
Primacon Holding, supra note 83.
90
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simplifies recognition of the foreign scheme of arrangement, which has been
held to enable recognition of foreign schemes of arrangement whether or not
the arrangement involves restructuring of a solvent entity.93 Indeed, US
bankruptcy courts have held that solvent insurer’s schemes of arrangement
are subject to recognition under chapter 15, even though neither a domestic
nor a foreign insurance company could otherwise access US bankruptcy jurisdiction.94 The court in Codere based its finding that the foreign scheme of
arrangement proposed there would be “effective” based in part on the company’s conditioning of the scheme on its recognition under US chapter 15.95
Foreign schemes of arrangement involving EU-registered companies may
also need to demonstrate that they can be enforced under applicable European PIL rules.96 European law is referenced because this “effectiveness” test
asks whether the British court’s order sanctioning the scheme of arrangement
is subject to recognition and enforcement against the affected creditors.
Three EU regulations are relevant here: the EU Insolvency Regulation; the
Brussels Regulation; the Rome Regulation.
If the EU Insolvency Regulation had governed these schemes of arrangement,97 it would have ensured automatic recognition and enforcement of
scheme orders98 but for the regulation’s selective application to certain “insolvency proceedings,”99 which are defined narrowly and specified in an Annex
to the Regulation. The Annex does not include reference to the English
Companies Act or to schemes of arrangement.100
British courts have instead looked to two other sources to satisfy them93
Sections 1501 et seq., U.S.C.A. See, e.g., Look Chan Ho, Creative Uses of Chapter 15 of the US
Bankruptcy Code to Smooth Cross-Border Restructurings, 24(9) J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 485 (Aug. 31,
2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1465053.
94
See, e.g., Jennifer D. Morton, Note: Recognition of Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings: An Evaluation
of Solvent Schemes of Arrangement and Part VII Transfers under U.S. Chapter 15, 29 FORD. INT’L L.J.
1312 (June 2006).
95
Codere, supra note 42.
96
Recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial cases was originally governed
within the European Communities by the 1968 Brussels Convention. 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Maters, Council of the European Union
(1968), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:41968A0927(01):EN:NOT
[hereinafter “Brussels Convention”]. . The Brussels Convention was initially signed by the six members of
the EC and later acceded to by the UK in 1973 (and other new entrants) upon entering the Community.
The Brussels Convention should eventually be replaced by the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Council of the European Union [hereinafter
“Lugano Convention”], http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?redirect=true&treatyId=7481. In the meantime, it has been nearly completely superseded within the EU by subsequent regulation. See infra, note 102 (discussing Brussels I and Brussels II
Regulations).
97
EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 14.
98
Id. at Art. 16.
99
Id. at Arts. 2, 3.
100
Id. at Annex A.
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selves that the foreign scheme is “effective” because it is enforceable against
creditors residing in EU member states.101 While neither source alone provides a basis for the recognition and enforcement of scheme orders, cobbled
together, courts draw sufficient comfort to find this jurisprudential requirement satisfied.
First, in finding that a foreign scheme would be “effective,” English courts
have referred to academic opinion letters offered as evidence and concluding
that the Brussels Regulation (whether the original 2000 version or the 2012
revised version)102 would govern and require recognition and enforcement of
an order sanctioning a scheme of arrangement across Europe.103 The scope of
the Brussels Regulation is understood broadly to reach “all the main civil and
commercial matters apart from certain well-defined matters.”104 Since it is
clear that schemes of arrangement sit outside the EU Insolvency Regulation,105 it has been mostly assumed that schemes sit inside the Brussels Regulation.106 The two regulations have been viewed as dovetailed with
corresponding hand-and-glove scope provisions that, at least presumably, did
not allow for gaps in coverage.107
But the fit between foreign schemes of arrangement and their enforcement under the Brussels Regulation is not without question. First, there is
the issue of the scope and exception provisions in the Brussels Regulation.
Whether looking at the initial version of the Brussels Regulation (circa 2000)
or its revision (circa 2012), the Regulation states that it “shall apply in civil
and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal.”108
Both Brussels I and II identically state that the “Regulation shall not apply”
101
See, e.g., Lucas Kortmann & Michael Vader, The Uneasy Case for Schemes of Arrangement Under
English Law in Relation to Non-UK Companies in Financial Distress: Pushing Europe?, 3 NIBLeJ 13
(2015).
102
For the first Brussels Regulation, see Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000
(“Brussels I”). For the recast Brussels Regulation, see Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 (“Brussels II”) [Brussels I and Brussels II are sometimes also referred to herein as the “Judgments
Regulation”]. For case law referring either to Brussels I or II to support this “effectiveness” finding, see,
e.g., Rodenstock and Primacom, supra note 83; see also Payne, supra note 35 (analyzing conclusion that
foreign schemes of arrangement are subject to recognition and enforcement under Brussels Regulation).
103
Despite references to these opinion letters, English courts have not directly ruled on the applicability of the Brussels Regulation to scheme orders. See The Rise and Rise of English Schemes of Arrangement,
ALLEN & OVERY (Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/The-rise-andrise-of-the-English-scheme-of-arrangement.aspx (“Despite an increased focus on the issue in recent cases
such as Van Gansewinkel Groep BV, no decision has been made on whether the Judgments Regulation
[Brussels I] applies to schemes; the English court has proceeded on the basis of arguments that it has
jurisdiction whether or not the [it] applies.”).
104
Brussels I, at pmbl., ¶ (7).
105
EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 14, at Annex A.
106
See Brussels I, at Art. 1(2)(b).
107
See Payne, supra note 35.
108
Brussels I, Art. 1(1); Brussels II, Art. 1(1).
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to “bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous
proceedings.”109 Logically, the “bankruptcy exclusion” should match perfectly
with the distinct rules for recognition and enforcement of judgments set out
in the EU Insolvency Regulation, but a small amount of ambiguity still remains.110 Unlike the Annex to the EU Insolvency Regulation, which carefully sets out the laws governing “insolvency proceedings” within the
meaning of that regulation, the Brussels Regulations do not contain a correlative list.111
Second, while broadly perceived as enabling the recognition and enforcement of judgments entered in civil and commercial proceedings, the Brussels
Regulation is drafted with mostly adversarial proceedings in mind.112 Its jurisdictional references to “defendants” are hard to square with the non-adversarial, multi-party structure of schemes,113 and the recently recast Brussels
Regulation is no clearer on this issue of scope.114 This requirement may be
met where there is at least one defendant-creditor residing in England, but
given modern debt structures the residence of the company’s creditors may
not be easy to determine.
Where questions existed, courts also considered the so-called Rome Regulation.115 The Rome Regulation does not speak to the question of the recognition and enforcement of judgments. Instead, per Article 3(1) it mandates
application of the law chosen by the parties; Article 12 provides that the
governing law of the contract should also govern “the various ways of extinguishing obligations and prescriptions and limitations on actions” in relation
to the contract.”116 Whether these provisions would require deference to
English courts’ implementation of schemes of arrangement as set out in English law depends in turn on the scope provisions of the Rome Regulation.
109

Brussels I, Art. 1(2)(b); Brussels II, Art. 1(2)(b).
See Payne, supra note 35 (describing the argument that the Brussels Regulation does not cover
scheme orders, but noting her skepticism for the strength of this contention).
111
There are several Annexes to Brussels I and II, but neither lists proceedings that fit within the
“bankruptcy exclusion.”
112
See Jan-Jaap Kuipers, Schemes of Arrangement and Voluntary Collective Redress: A Gap in the
Brussels I Regulation, 8(2) J. PRIV. INT’L L. 225–49 (2012).
113
Id.
114
See Brussels II, supra note 102.
115
Council Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations [hereinafter “Rome Regulation” or “Rome I”]. Another regulation, related to Rome I, was promulgated by the European Council, this one on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, Council
Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 [hereinafter “Rome II”]. Rome I and II together supersede an earlier
European convention on the same topic, Convention 80/934/ECC on the law applicable to contractual
obligations opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980. For discussion of English cases relying on
Rome Regulation to find that foreign scheme orders would be “effective,” see, e.g., Payne, supra note 35.
116
Rome I, supra note 101, at Arts. 3(1) & 12.
110
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The breadth of the scope is not entirely free from argument. Article 1(2)(f)
of that Regulation states:
Questions governed by the law of companies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated, such as the creation, by registration or otherwise, legal capacity, internal organisation
or winding-up of companies and other bodies, corporate or
unincorporated, and the personal liability of officers and
members as such for the obligations of the company or body
shall be excluded from the ambit of the regulation.117
This reference to “the law of companies” as sitting outside the scope of the
Rome Regulation might mean that schemes of arrangement also sit outside
Rome since schemes of arrangement are governed by English law. Commentators mostly disagree with this reading.118 However, the needle can be
threaded as follows:
[I]t could be argued that this exclusion seems to be aimed
predominantly at corporate governance issues, and matters
concerning the life and death of companies, rather than procedures to vary the contractual rights of the members and
other stakeholders. Indeed, it could be argued that the sorts
of schemes with which we are concerned, namely creditor
schemes aimed at restructuring the debt of the company,
seem to be predominantly geared towards rearranging the
contractual arrangements of the parties inter se, rather than
affecting the company’s share capital or anything affecting
the company per se.119
In practical effect, this would mean that European courts would be bound to
recognize the effect of a scheme as a part of its obligation to enforce debt
governed by English law, including the contractual variation of the parties’
rights under the finance documents as a result of the scheme of arrangement,
even if the order sanctioning the scheme was not itself recognized as a judgment covered by the Brussels Regulation. But this construction of Rome I
has not been tested in the courts, and reasonable arguments to the contrary
might well be viewed as convincing.120
117

Id. at Art. 1(2)(f).
See, e.g., F. Garcimartin, The Review of EU Insolvency Regulation: Some General Considerations and
Two Selected Issues (Hybrid Procedures and Netting Arrangements), in L. LENNARTS; F. Garcimartı́n,
The Review of the EU Insolvency Regulation: Some Proposals for Amendment, NETHERLANDS ASSOCIATION FOR COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW, s. 28 (2011), http://www.naciil.org/
publications/preadviezen-reports-2011/.
119
Payne, supra note 35.
120
See, e.g., Kortmann & Veder, supra note 101, at 253–54 (questioning whether schemes of arrange118
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In the end, expert opinions offered by German, Dutch, Spanish and other
European practitioners have satisfied British courts that their orders sanctioning foreign schemes were likely to be enforced across Europe, one way or
another. As a result, British courts have found that the schemes would, despite the off-shore residence of many creditors, be “effective.”121 But there is
no case squarely holding that either the Brussels or Rome Regulations would
so govern.
By and large, European courts have not upset English courts’ scheme orders on the grounds that EU Regulations did not require recognition and
enforcement, but there is one notable exception. In 2012, the German Federal Court of Justice upheld an intermediate appellate court decision denying
recognition of an English court’s order sanctioning creditor approval of
scheme of arrangement involving Equitable Life, a mutual life assurance company incorporated in the United Kingdom.122 Although the German policyholders voted against the English scheme of arrangement in Equitable Life,
they were too few in number and too small in value to preclude entry of an
order binding them to the arrangement. Equitable Life defended subsequent
litigation before German courts on the grounds that EU law required recognition of the scheme, but the German courts rejected these contentions and
held that the English scheme sat outside not only the EU Insolvency Regulation, but also the Brussels Regulation.123 Because the Equitable Life scheme
involved an insurance company, the Brussels Regulation imposed special jurisdictional requirements.124 The Brussels Regulation subjected the insurer to
proceedings brought in the courts of the EU member state in which its creditors are domiciled, whether the creditors are policyholders, insureds, or beneficiaries of a company domiciled in another EU member state.125 Under the
Brussels Regulation, the German policyholders were not bound by the English court’s order, especially as relates to questions of German law.
While initially causing concern among London solicitors, British lawyers
quickly came to the conclusion that Equitable Life was distinguishable on the
grounds that the scheme in that case had involved an insurance company, the
objecting creditor had been a German policyholder, and that German not
English law governed that creditor’s claim.126 In subsequent cases, English
ment should be characterized as “an issue of contract law,” and thus governed by Rome I, especially as
relates to enforcement of a scheme order against dissenting creditors).
121
See, e.g., Re Rodenstock [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch.), supra note 83; see also Payne, supra note 35, at
102 (discussing importance of opinion letters to courts’ “effectiveness” findings).
122
Der Bundesgerichtshof (The German Federal Court of Justice) 15 February 2012, IV ZR 194/09;
see also, e.g., Hermanns, supra note 39.
123
Hermanns, supra note 39.
124
Brussels I, Art. 12; Brussels II, Art. 14.
125
Id.
126
Payne, supra note 35, at 586.
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courts have approved foreign schemes of arrangement, unfettered by the decision of the German Bundesgerichtshof in Equitable Life.127
B. THE FORUM SHOPPING SYSTEM
ARRANGEMENT

FOR

FOREIGN SCHEMES

OF

All of the above confirms that, over the past several years, British courts
have permitted foreign schemes of arrangement despite conduct that might
well have been considered forum shopping. Courts are aware of these concerns, but do not view foreign companies’ efforts to seek court approval of a
scheme of arrangement that would not have been available under the law of
the debtor’s place of registration or COMI as problematic. They justify this
extra-territorial assertion of jurisdiction by distinguishing between good and
bad forum shopping.
In sanctioning the scheme of arrangement offered on behalf of the Spanish
Codere group of companies, for example, the London High Court addressed
the claim that the scheme should be denied on the grounds of forum shopping.
The Codere court conceded that forum shopping might be at work in the
case, but distinguished between good and bad forum shopping:
In a sense, of course, what was done in the AI Scheme case,
and what is sought to be achieved in the present case is forum shopping. Debtors are seeking to give the English court
jurisdiction so that they can take advantage of the scheme
jurisdiction available here and which is not widely available,
if available at all, elsewhere. Plainly forum shopping can be
undesirable. That can potentially be so, for example, where a
debtor seeks to move his COMI with a view to taking advantage of a more favourable bankruptcy regime and so escaping his debts. In cases such as the present, however, what
is being attempted is to achieve a position where resort can
be had to the law of a particular jurisdiction, not in order to
evade debts but rather with a view to achieving the best
possible outcome for creditors. If in those circumstances it is
appropriate to speak of forum shopping at all, it must be on
the basis that there can sometimes be good forum
shopping.128
Although each of the foreign debtors seeking to reach a scheme of arrangement with their creditors intentionally sought to escape the reach of (foreign)
insolvency laws for another (in this case British), they did so for good reasons:
127
128

See, e.g., Codere, supra note 42.
Codere, supra note 42, at 18.
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to maximize distributions to creditors. It follows that this practice is good
forum shopping and should be excused, contends the court. Under this view,
bad forum shopping involves an evasion of debt rather than an avoidance of
insolvency law.129
The Codere court’s characterization of the company’s conduct as involving good forum shopping, thus, turns on a combination of factors: some utilitarian and others more focused on consent. As it relates to beneficial effects,
whatever advantage-taking might have been involved in this scheme of arrangement, it was not an effort by the company to take advantage of the
company’s creditors, who were set to receive substantially more than they
would have received in a Spanish insolvency proceeding. The court’s reference to the scheme as the “best possible outcome for creditors” suggests that
both the company and creditors are better off with the scheme – in other
words, the forum shopping was “efficient.”
The consent, here, might be overrated, however. Schemes differ from assertions of forum shopping made in conventional litigation, in which a plaintiff seeks the substantive benefits of some law and a defendant objects to the
application of these benefits in an adversarial setting. Schemes of arrangement involve multiple parties in interest and may be uncontroverted.130 Still,
they are only binding under the Companies Act if 50 percent in number and
75 percent of the value of these claims vote in favor of the proposal. The
creditors in this case were, by a large super-majority vote, willing participants in the shopping trip if “forum shopping” was the goal.131 Moreover, the
consent of the creditors and other affected stakeholders in Codere was compounded by the consent of two additional institutions: the British court
found that the scheme satisfied the jurisdictional and jurisprudential requirements imposed by English law; continental European courts did not decline
enforcement of the scheme order.132
129
Although Codere SA and other European companies seeking enforcement of a scheme of arrangement under the English Companies Act are not looking to pay their creditors less, they are seeking to
escape harsh aspects of the insolvency laws of Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium or Luxembourg.
In some instances, these “harsh” European insolvency laws look to protect some public interest (intellectual property holders in Codere, for example) and narrow class of claimants (intellectual property rights
holders in Codere, for example).
130
Schemes of arrangement are often uncontroverted in the sense that dissenting creditors who find
themselves outvoted in a scheme of arrangement are left with mostly procedural arguments to be made
before the English court; although these sorts of objections do get registered occasionally, as was the case
in the Indah Kiat scheme, procedural objections are more likely to delay court approval of the scheme than
derail it entirely. See Re Indah Kiat International Finance Company BV [2016] EWHC 246 (Ch.) (denying on procedural grounds application pertaining to scheme of arrangement filed by solvent Dutch company with registered branch in UK).
131
For an extensive argument against focusing on litigants’ motivations when distinguishing between
“good” and “bad” forum shopping, see Bookman, supra note 3, at 630–32.
132
Continental European courts have declined to enforce a foreign scheme of arrangement on only one
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The breadth of institutional support for foreign schemes of arrangement,
thus, evidences what some scholars refer to as a forum shopping system.133
Forum shopping systems are said to arise when permissive jurisdictional rules
enabling broad access to certain courts are coupled with favorable substantive laws.134 These open-ended jurisdictional rules provide access to substantive laws favoring specific economic or social interests. With forum shopping
systems, litigants’ forum shopping is enabled and sometimes even openly encouraged by a legal system’s forum selling.135 System-wide involvement of
litigants, courts, and possibly even legislatures is required to “package” a forum as a desirable destination for dispute resolution.136
The treatment of foreign schemes of arrangement fits the paradigm of a
forum shopping system. Because schemes of arrangement sit outside the
scope of the EU Insolvency Regulation, company’s seeking a court-ordered
scheme need not satisfy stricter jurisdictional limitations it sets out.137 British courts’ interpretation of weak domestic jurisdictional limitations to the
opening of a scheme broadly enables even foreign companies, companies
whose place or registration or incorporation sits outside the United Kingdom, to access English restructuring law, although the same company might
have been precluded from accessing English insolvency law as a result of the
EU Insolvency Regulation.138 Companies seek access to scheme procedures
occasion, in a context that was easily distinguishable. For discussion of German courts’ decisions in Equitable Life, see supra text accompanying note 37. For an argument that the distinction between “good” and
“bad” forum shopping ought to consider questions of consistency with international law, see Bookman,
supra note 3, at 632-33.
133
See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 55; Whytock, supra note 55. Some commentators emphasize the
involvement of courts in forum shopping, referring to courts’ roles in the system as a case of “forum
selling.” See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 8; see also Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the
Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1182–83 (2007).
134
Weinberg, supra note 55; Whytock, supra note 55.
135
See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 8 (defining “forum selling” and applying term to several distinct
issue areas within United States).
136
Where “forum selling” is viewed as the result of judicial decisionmaking aimed at attracting plaintiffs’ complaints in particularly issue areas, Klerman & Reilly, supra note 2, analysis of “forum shopping
systems” examines all relevant actors including the litigants, courts, but also legislators and other
lawmakers, since the jurisdictional rules that enable forum shopping may be crafted with an eye to encouraging or limiting access to courts. Commentators presume that forum selling is problematic where decisions about venue are left in plaintiffs’ hands, but beneficial where sophisticated contracting parties make
venue decisions ex ante in the contract that binds them both. Id. This article focuses on “forum shopping
systems” in an effort to open up examination of all relevant actors rather than focus predominately on
courts’ or litigants’ participation in a forum shopping system, and to remain agnostic as to whether the
forum shopping is “good” regardless of whether venue choices are set by means of contractual agreement.
137
EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 14, at Art. 3 (limiting recognition to insolvency proceedings as a
main proceeding if commenced in the member state of the European Union where the debtor’s “centre of
main interests” is situated, and allowing recognition of a secondary proceeding in some instances in which
an establishment of the debtor is so located.”).
138
See text and accompanying supra notes 48–50, and 61–127 (discussing British courts’ approval of
foreign schemes of arrangements, only some of which involved shifts in the debtors’ COMIs).
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because of their speed and simplicity, but also because it is easier to bind
dissenting creditors to the terms of restructuring arrangement through a
scheme of arrangement than through a composition under most continental
European countries’ laws, and because schemes are less complicated and cumbersome than a full blown insolvency proceeding.139
Cross-border forum shopping systems require a background system of recognition and enforcement to be effective. PIL treaties provide transnational
assurances of this sort.140 Domestic PIL could also provide clarity.141
The court in Codere found that entry of an order sanctioning a scheme of
arrangement involving a Spanish corporate group was consistent with the
requirements of EU law,142 and based its conclusions on expert opinions it
had solicited from Spanish and European law experts.143 British courts’ reading of EU regulations might have been second-guessed by courts in other EU
member states, but this has not happened.144 Indeed, only rarely have continental European courts questioned enforcement of British court orders approving foreign schemes of arrangement, and the one case to the contrary can
easily be distinguished as involving a company in a regulated industry subject
to a distinct set of European PIL rules.145
European law governing (or potentially governing) automatic recognition
and enforcement of schemes of arrangement (and possibly foreign schemes of
139
English schemes of arrangement can be used to bind creditors to a restructuring agreement on the
basis of assent by 75 percent in the value of the effected claims, whereas many continental European
courts would bind dissenters to a restructuring only if 90-95 percent in the value of the debt agrees to the
modification. See GOODE, supra note 17, at 42; see also infra note 245.
140
PIL conventions are notoriously difficult to put into place. The Hague Conference on PIL
(“HCCH”) has existed as an ad hoc organization since 1893, and an inter-governmental organization since
1955, but has succeeded only rarely in negotiating PIL conventions that enter into force. For more information on the HCCH, see, e.g., Georges Droz, A Comment on the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994). The European Union has had greater success in
negotiating and implementing PIL conventions and regulations, but these bind mostly member states in the
EU. For a thorough discussion of such law, see PETER STONE, EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Elgar
Euro. L. 3d ed., 2014). In addition, UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (MLCBI), now
implemented in more than 40 countries, could provide important supplemental enforcement. For the text
of this MLCBI, see UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment and
Interpretation (2014), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013Guide-Enactment-e.pdf.
141
See, e.g., Bookman, supra note 3, at 633–34 (discussing importance of US law on recognition and
enforcement of judgments on distinction between “good” and “bad” forum shopping).
142
Codere, supra note 42, at 15 (concluding that “I do not think that either the [EU] Insolvency
Regulation or the recast Judgments Regulation could present any obstacle to my making an order.”).
143
Id.
144
Ultimately, questions of the proper interpretation of the scope of the Brussels and Rome Regulations, as with other European regulations, would be subject to resolution by the CJEU. See, e.g., KOEN
LENAERTS, IGNACE MASELIS & KATHLEEN GUTMAN, EU PROCEDURAL LAW ¶ 21.07, at 721 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2014).
145
For discussion of German courts’ unwillingness to recognize and enforce the scheme order entered
in Equitable Life Assurance, especially its limiting facts, see supra text accompanying notes 122–123.
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arrangement) has recently been renegotiated. These revisions might evidence
a shifting consensus in the forum shopping system for insolvency or restructuring proceedings. Accordingly, the next section focuses in on these changes.
II. SCHEMES AND THE REVISION OF EU LAW
British courts’ willingness to open insolvency proceedings brought on the
heels of a corporate migration, and their willingness to approve similar foreign
schemes of arrangement, has not escaped Brussels’ attention. Very recently,
the EU “responded” to practitioners’ requests that European law address
modern insolvency and restructuring practices in its revisions to the EU Insolvency Regulation and proposal for a harmonizing Directive on Preventive
Restructuring Frameworks.146 Despite questions about whether the EU Insolvency Regulation ought to extend to schemes of arrangement, EU negotiations mostly left the status quo in place.
A. RECAST EU INSOLVENCY REGULATION.
In revising the EU Insolvency Regulation, the Council and European Parliament expanded its scope by broadening the definition of covered “insolvency proceedings.” Despite this expansion, schemes of arrangement are still
not listed in Annex A, and as a result, the Recast Insolvency Regulation still
does not cover them. The question of whether “foreign” schemes of arrangement ought to be recognized and enforced across Europe is nonetheless implicitly addressed in these revisions, which tackle the problem of forum
shopping through several means.
1. Scope.
The scope of the original EU Insolvency Regulation was relatively narrow, covering only “collective insolvency proceedings which entail the partial
or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator.”147 This
is a four-part test requiring (i) collective proceedings (ii) pertaining to an
insolvent debtor, which entail both (iii) the partial or total divestment of a
debtor’s property, as well as (iv) “the appointment of a liquidator.”148 Further, two definitional provisions clarify the meaning of the jurisdictional
phrase “insolvency proceedings” in the original Insolvency Reg: First, Art. 2
provides that “insolvency proceedings shall mean the collective proceedings
referred to in Art. 1(1).” It goes on to state that “these proceedings are listed
in Annex A” to the regulation. Annex A lists the “insolvency proceedings”
subject to the scope of the regulation for each EU member state. Relating to
the UK, Annex A refers to winding up proceedings,, administrations, volun146

Proposed Restructuring Directive, supra note 59.
EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 14, at Art. 1(1).
148
Id.
147
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tary arrangements under the insolvency legislation, bankruptcy or sequestration; it does not refer to schemes of arrangement under the Companies Act.
Commentators report that the exclusion of schemes of arrangement from the
original EU Insolvency Regulation was intentional.149
The Recast EU Insolvency Regulation is ever-so-slightly broader in
scope. It continues to provide that it applies to “collective proceedings,”150
defined as “proceedings which include all or a significant part of a debtor’s
creditors, provided that, in the latter case, the proceedings do not affect the
claims of creditors which are not involved in them.”151 Although the Recast
EU Insolvency Regulation continues to refer to collective proceedings relating to insolvency, the whole of its language is broader and very nuanced. In
full, it reads as follows:
1. This Regulation shall apply to public collective proceedings, including interim proceedings, which are based on
laws relating to insolvency and in which, for the purpose
of rescue, adjustment of debt, reorganisation or
liquidation:
a. debtor is totally or partially divested of its assets
and an insolvency practitioner is appointed;
b. the assets and affairs of a debtor are subject to control or supervision by a court; or
c. temporary stay of individual enforcement proceedings is granted by a court or by operation of law, in
order to allow for negotiations between the debtor
and its creditors, provided that the proceedings in
which the stay is granted provide for suitable measures to protect the general body of creditors, and,
where no agreement is reached, are preliminary to
one of the proceedings referred to in point (a) or (b).
Where the proceedings referred to in this paragraph may be
commenced in situations where there is only a likelihood of
insolvency, their purpose shall be to avoid the debtor’s insolvency or the cessation of the debtor’s business activities.
The proceedings referred to in this paragraph are listed in Annex A.152
While this test has far more than four parts, several aspects of it are important to emphasize when considering the question of whether schemes of arrangements fit within the scope of the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation.
149

See, e.g., Baines, supra note 78.
Recast EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 56, at Art. 1.
151
Id. at Art. 2(1).
152
Id. at Art. 1.
150
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While the original covered “collective insolvency proceedings,”153 the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation covers “collective proceedings . . . relating to
insolvency.”154 In one place, these are referred to as “public collective proceedings.”155 Second, these proceedings must have as their purpose “rescue,
adjustment of debt, reorganization or liquidation.”156 In addition, Art. 1 specifies the consequences of such proceedings as involving divestment, judicial
supervision, or a moratorium on “individual enforcement proceedings.”157 Importantly, subparts (a) through (c) are expressly identified as three alternative
consequences to “collective proceedings . . . relating to insolvency,” which is
to say (a) or (b) or (c), but not necessarily more than one of these consequences.158 That the phrase “collective proceedings . . . relating to insolvency” is intended to be broader than “collective insolvency proceedings” is
also clear from the first of two unnumbered paragraphs at the end of Art. 1,
which refers to covered proceedings “commenced in situations where there is
only a likelihood of insolvency” and limits the scope of the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation to those with the purpose of “avoid[ing] the debtor’s insolvency or the cessation of the debtor’s business activities.”159
Notwithstanding this expansion in scope, the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation continues to tie its scope provision to Annex A, and as a result cannot be viewed as extending to schemes of arrangement.160 As currently
drafted, Annex A does not include schemes of arrangement in the list of UK
laws subject to the EU Insolvency Regulation and so they continue to sit
outside its scope.161 Only member states can make the determination as to
what to add to the annex.
Moreover (although there is no reason need for a second ground for ratio153

EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 14, at Art. 1(1).
Recast EU Reg., supra note 56, at Art. 1.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id. at Art. 1(a)–(c).
159
Id. at Art. 1, first unnumbered paragraph.
160
Id.at Art. 1, second unnumbered paragraph.
161
This does not mean that there was no consideration as to whether schemes ought to get included.
Indeed, it is clear that the British Insolvency Service sought guidance from industry actors on their preference regarding the list of UK laws that should get set out on Annex A to the Recast EU Insolvency Reg.
See British Insolvency Service, European Commission Recommendation of 12.3.14 on a new approach to
business failure and insolvency (February 2015). Professional associations responded negatively to the idea
of expanding Annex A to include schemes, and did so specifically on the grounds that foreign schemes of
arrangement would not have been subject to recognition and enforcement if governed by the EU Insolvency Reg. See City of London Law Society, Insolvency Law Committee, the Insolvency Lawyers’ Association, and the Association of Business Recovery Professionals, Joint Response to Proposed changes to the
European Insolvency Regulation: Call for Evidence, Q5 (February 25, 2013), http://www.citysolicitors
.org.uk/attachments/article/119/IS-call-for-evidence-on-changes-to-EU-IR-joint-responses-of-ILA-CLLSR3-25-~.pdf. See also, e.g., Baines & Davies, supra note 78.
154
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nale), schemes of arrangement involve none of the consequences set out in
Recast EU Insolvency Regulation, Art. 1(a) through (c), and so do not fit
within this expanded definition: as to (a), the company is not divested of any
of its assets, nor is an insolvency practitioner appointed; as to (b), neither the
assets nor the affairs of the company are subject to the control or supervision
of a court; and as to (c), no stay is automatically triggered. The closest that
this scope provision comes to covering schemes of arrangement is with Art.
1(b), in that courts are involved in approving creditors’ meetings, in assessing
whether the requisite number and value of creditors voted in favor of the
scheme, and in entering an order sanctioning the arrangement as binding on
the company’s creditors, even those dissenting from the proposed scheme.
The reach of Art. 1(b) would depend, in large part, on how the phrase
“subject to control or supervision of a court” is later defined. It would depend,
as well, on whether the United Kingdom adopts legislative proposals to
strengthen schemes of arrangement and insolvency law more generally.162
One proposal would, for example, provide for the possibility of a temporary
stay pending negotiations on a scheme.163 These proposals are controversial,
especially those that would alter scheme of arrangement procedures.164 Given
the current political situation in the United Kingdom, legislation on schemes
of arrangements or any other effort to build up corporate rescue culture seem
unlikely to get acted on any time soon, however.165
There is also new language added to the Recitals of the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation, which seems indirectly to speak to whether scheme orders
ought to get recognized and enforced in continental European courts. Recital
(7), identically to its predecessor, connects the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation to the EU Brussels Regulation on recognition and enforcement of judgments on civil and commercial matters.166 This paragraph goes on, however,
to note that the two regulations “should as much as possible” be interpreted
to “avoid regulatory loopholes between the two instruments.” The Recital
also states that “the mere fact that a national procedure is not listed in Annex
162
British Insolvency Service, A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework: A Consultation on
Options for Reform (May 2016), http://www.cicm.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/A_Review_of_
the_Corporate_Insolvency_Framework.pdf.
163
Id. at 11, ¶ 7.
164
See, e.g., City of London Law Society, Insolvency Law Committee, Response to Insolvency Service
Consultation, A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework – A consultation on options for reform (July
5, 2016), http://www.citysolicitors.org.uk/attachments/article/119/CLLS%20Response%20to%20Cor
porate%20Insolvency%20Framework%20Consultation%20-%2005%2007%2016.pdf.
165
The results of the snap election called by Prime Minister May have called into question the direction and likely success of Brexit negotiations. The degree to which the UK’s exit from the EU will favor
the UK is even less clear than it already had been.
166
Recast EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 56, at Rec. (7). This language is contrary to commentators’
conclusions on how the original EU Insolvency Reg. should be read with Brussels I or II. See Payne, supra
note 35.
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A to this Regulation should not imply that it is covered by. . .” the Brussels
Regulation.167
The language is especially interesting as it relates to the question of
whether British courts’ scheme orders should be viewed as governed by the
Brussels Regulation. Opinion letters submitted to English courts by European law experts had, in the past, justified their conclusion that the Brussels
Regulation would govern orders sanctioning a scheme of arrangement under
English law in part on the grounds that scheme orders clearly sat outside the
scope of the Insolvency Regulation. Since “the scope of [the Brussels] Regulation must cover all the main civil and commercial matters apart from certain
well-defined [exclusions],”168 the view was that the Brussels Regulation must
include scheme orders since they are so clearly excluded from the EU Insolvency Regulation. But now the Recitals to the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation provide that gaps can exist between it and the Brussels Regulation,
despite jurists’ presumptions to the contrary.
2. Forum Shopping.
So far this discussion has been limited to the scope of the Recast EU
Insolvency Regulation, finding that its expanding scope does not yet extend
to foreign schemes of arrangements. In several ways, however, the Recast
EU Insolvency Regulation speaks more directly to the issue of forum shopping and, thus, indirectly to the question of whether British courts’ scheme
orders ought not to be recognized under any other European law.
First, the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation more expressly defines the
applicable jurisdictional standard.169 Among other clarifications, the presumption that a debtor’s COMI, or “centre of main interests,” is situated in
the debtor’s place of registration will now apply only if the registered office
has not been moved to another member state in the three months before an
application to commence insolvency proceedings has been brought.170 EU
drafters made relatively clear that inclusion of this three-month venue reachback period constitutes an effort to curb corporate migrations on the eve of
an insolvency filing. Recital (5) to the revised EU Insolvency Regulation
speaks to the necessity of avoiding “incentives for parties to transfer assets or
judicial proceedings from one Member State to another, seeking to obtain a
more favourable legal position to the detriment of the general body of credi167

Id. at Rec. (7). Confusingly, however, Recital (9) refers to Annex A as an exhaustive list. Id. at Rec.

(9).
168

Brussels I, at Rec. (7); Brussels II, at Rec. (10).
Recast EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 56, Art. 3.
170
Recast EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 56, at Art. 3(1). This provision also explicitly incorporates
the language, previously found in a Recital to the original EU Insolvency Reg., that “the centre of main
interests shall be the place where the debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis
and which is ascertainable by third parties.” Id.
169
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tors (forum shopping).”171 Moreover, a Commission Staff Report prepared in
2012 identifies forum shopping as among the problems sought to be redressed
by revisions to the EU Insolvency Regulation.172
Despite this explicit limit on COMI shifts, condemnation of “forum shopping” is more qualified than complete in the revised EU Insolvency Regulation. The 2012 Commission Staff Report, for example, refers to “abusive
COMI-shopping” and companies relocating “specifically with the aim of benefitting from a more favourable foreign insolvency regime,” but also argues
that “not all such relocation can be considered abusive,” particularly in light
of CJEU case law accepting such moves “as a legitimate exercise of the freedom of establishment.”173 The Recitals to the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation speak of forum shopping as an effort to “obtain a more favourable legal
position” for the debtor that is “detriment[al to] the general body of creditors.174 Despite its emphasis on “picking and choosing between laws” as the
epitome of forum shopping, the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation is also careful to define forum shopping as problematically working to the “detriment of
the general body of creditors.”175 Elsewhere, the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation describes “a number of safeguards aimed at preventing fraudulent or
abusive forum shopping,”176 without distinguishing between “fraudulent” and
“abusive” forum shopping.177 For example, Recital 30 provides the rules permitting a rebuttal of the presumption that a debtor’s place of registration is
its COMI, and encourages rebuttal, for example, “where it can be established
that the principal reason for moving was to file for insolvency proceedings in
the new jurisdiction and where such filing would materially impair the interests of creditors whose dealings with the debtor took place prior to the relocation.”178 Recital 31 similarly talks about a new rule “with the same
objective of preventing fraudulent or abusive forum shopping.”179
171

Recast EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 56, at Rec. (5).
Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment accompanying the document Revision of
Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, SWD (2012) 416 final (Dec. 12, 2012), at 2022, ¶ 3.4.1.2 [hereinafter “Staff Report”], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency-ia_en.pdf. .
173
Id. at 20 (“There are several cases where COMI relocation to the UK allowed the successful
restructuring of a company because of the flexibility which English insolvency law grants companies in this
respect.”).
174
Recast EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 56, at Rec. (5).
175
Id.
176
Id. at Rec. (29).
177
For an effort to distinguish between fraudulent and abusive forum shopping in this context, see, e.g.,
Eidenmuller, Abuse of Law, supra note 25.
178
Recast EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 56, at Rec. (30).
179
Id. at Rec. (31) (referring to Art. 3(1), ¶ 2, which permits rebutting the presumption that, in the
case of a company or legal person, the place of registration is its COMI, but only “if the registered office
has not been moved to another Member State within the 3-month period prior to the request for the
opining of insolvency proceedings.”).

R

172

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ABK\92-1\ABK101.txt

2018)

unknown

Seq: 33

17-NOV-17

REACHING TO RESTRUCTURE ACROSS BORDERS

10:12

33

B. PROPOSED EU RESTRUCTURING DIRECTIVE
Parliamentary proposals to expand and alter the reach of schemes of arrangement are consistent, as well, with European efforts to promote pre-insolvency restructuring in the domestic laws of each of the EU member states.
Late November 2016, the European Commission finalized a proposal for a
EU Directive on “preventative restructuring frameworks,”180 which looks to
“complement” the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation.181 Because the Recast
EU Insolvency Regulation “covers many types of insolvency procedures, including preventive/pre-insolvency procedures,” but does not obligate member
states either “to introduce specific types of procedures or to ensure that their
procedures are effective in promoting preventive restructuring and second
chance,”182 the Restructuring Directive requires member states:
[To] ensure that, where there is likelihood of insolvency,
debtors in financial difficulty have access to an effective preventive restructuring framework that enables them to
restructure their debts or business, restore their viability and
avoid insolvency.183
It also looks to set “minimum principles of effectiveness” for such procedures,184 by requiring that debtors accessing them “remain totally or at least
partially in control of their assets and day-to-day operation of the business,”185 by providing for a stay of individual enforcement actions while debtors are renegotiating a restructuring plan with their creditors,186 and
specifying aspects negotiations over and confirmation of the plan and its
effects.187
A full discussion of the details of the proposed Directive can be left for
another day.188 It is sufficient to remark here that the Directive expressly
refers to the World Bank Doing Business Index 2016,189 which in turn has
180

Proposal for Restructuring Directive, supra note 59.
Id. at 9.
182
Id.
183
Id. at Art. 4(1).
184
Id. at 9.
185
Id. at Art. 5(1)
186
Id. at Art. 6; see also id. at Art. 7.
187
Id. at Arts. 8–18.
188
For commendatory discussing the proposed Restructuring Directive in detail, see Horst Eidenmüller, Contracting for a European Insolvency Regime, 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 273 (2017) [hereinafter
“Eidenmüller, Contracting for Insolvency”]; Horst Eidenmüller & Kristen van Zwieten, Restructuring the
European Business Enterprise: the European Commission’s Recommendation on a New Approach to Business
Failure and Insolvency, 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 625 (2015); Kristen van Zwieten, Restructuring Law:
recommendations from the European Commission, EBRD: LAW IN TRANSITION ONLINE, at 2 (2014), http:/
/www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit114e.pdf.
189
For discussion of the World Bank Doing Business Index, see World Bank, About Doing Business
181
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been influenced by the work of the UN’s Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL).190 The World Bank and UNCITRAL proposals more
closely resemble US chapter 11 than UK schemes of arrangement. The EU
Restructuring Directive proposal draws on both of these international proposals, and as a result, it bears closer resemblance to US reorganization law
than UK schemes of arrangement. However, there are both important differences between the Directive and US chapter 11 and important similarities
between it and UK schemes, especially if they were revised as set out in
pending proposals.
Whether the proposed Directive will get finalized in its current format or
at all is impossible to predict. Within Europe, the proposal has prompted
criticism.191 The debate on the Directive will be interesting to watch, but it
is unlikely to be a debate that will involve much British participation given
the Brexit decision.
C. READING TEA LEAVES?
Read together, the pre-Brexit revision of the EU Insolvency Regulation
coupled with the proposed Restructuring Directive provide less than a full
embrace of foreign scheme of arrangement practices, and yet not an outright
EU rejection of this forum shopping system. Although Annex A to the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation remains free of reference to any scheme of
arrangement, its Recital 7 may make it just a little bit harder for commentators to conclude that the Brussels or Rome Regulations ensure recognition
and thus for British courts to sanction scheme orders as sufficiently “effective.” Mostly, the revisions leave the question of forum shopping to the
opening court, a decision that retains the status quo although it provides litigators new language to rely on in future disputes.
This highly negotiated result might have been intended by EU member
states to represent an interim resolution, pending full implementation of the
EU Restructuring Directive and the next scheduled revision of the EU Insolvency Regulation. But the referendum on Brexit ensured that this incremen(2017), http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB17-Chapters/DB17-About-Doing-Business.pdf. For more on the coordination between the insolvency related initiatives of the World Bank and UNCITRAL, see SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB & TERENCE C.
HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE CRAFTING OF WORLD
MARKETS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017).
190
In 2004, UNCITRAL promulgated its Legislative Guide on Insolvency Laws and thereafter supplemented it with additional recommendations on the insolvency treatment of enterprise groups (2010) and
directors’ obligation in the period approaching insolvency (2013). See, Legislative Guide on Insolvency
Law (Parts I – IV), UNCITRAL (2004, 2010 and 2013), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_
texts/insolvency.html.
191
See, e.g., Eidenmüller, Contracting for Insolvency, supra note 188; Eidenmüller & van Zwieten,
supra note 188.
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tal approach would get re-negotiated less than two years after the Recast EU
Insolvency Regulation entered into effect in June 2017.
III. THE EFFECTS OF BREXIT ON FOREIGN SCHEMES OF
ARRANGEMENT
In March 2017, Theresa May, the British Prime Minister, triggered Art.
50 and ensured that the United Kingdom would leave the European Union
within two years.192 The regulatory implications of this Brexit are mindboggling. The UK’s exit from the EU puts into question thousands of regulations and directives.193
A. APPLICABLE EU LAW
AND BREXIT

IN THE

GAP BETWEEN

THE

REFERENDUM

While the very complexity of Brexit creates enormous uncertainty, several things are perfectly clear about EU law on insolvency and restructuring
law. Until March 2019, the UK and all other EU countries except Demark
are parties to the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation. Regardless of Brexit,
the original EU Insolvency Regulation was repealed and the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation became effective, as of late June 2017. The European
Commission proposed its Directive on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks
in late November 2016. The EU Council and Parliament have not finalized
the proposal. Whether or not the Directive will get finalized, its effects are
unlikely to be felt for some time, since by its terms the Directive does not
require member states to adopt legislation to implement its terms until two
years after it enters into force.
It is also clear that schemes of arrangement as currently configured under
the 2006 Companies Act sit outside the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation.
Whether recognition and enforcement of scheme orders are governed by either the Brussels or Rome Regulations is not settled, but the working presumption that one or both of these regulations requires enforcement of orders
sanctioning schemes of arrangement became less clear in late June 2017 when
the recitals in the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation went into effect. In the
past, it had been assumed that where the Insolvency Regulation left off the
Brussels Regulation would fill in, and as a result no orders or judgments entered in a civil or commercial context would be excluded from those entitled
to pan-European recognition and enforcement. Language in the recitals to
192
It is less clear whether the UK will also exit the European Economic Area (EEA), and whether it
might join the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). If it remains in the EEA, or joins the EFTA, there is
some possibility that the Directive on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks would continue to govern
the UK, even after Brexit, but even this result is subject to contention. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 57.
193
Id. This article addresses only those regulations and directives relating to financial restructuring
through schemes of arrangement, considerably limiting the scope of this discussion of the effects of Brexit.
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Recast EU Insolvency Regulation raises questions as to that common-sense
approach. Although the terms of Brexit might resolve this question, resolution seems unlikely given the current pace of negotiations.
Finally, it is also clear that Brexit will mean that, within two years, current EU law will not govern recognition and enforcement of newly commenced schemes of arrangement under English law since the Brussels and
Rome Regulations would no longer bind the UK to EU member states, and
vice versa.194 There has been some contention that the Brussels Convention,
on which both Brussels Regulations were based, would continue to bind the
UK,195 even after Brexit.196 Others argue that neither the Brussels nor
Rome Conventions will bind the UK following Brexit.197 But by virtue of
later Protocols, parties bound to the conventions have also agreed that disputes under them are subject to review by the European Union Court of
Justice. “The UK Prime Minister has said that she does not want to accept
the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice and it is difficult to see how the
[Brussels or Rome Regulations] can work without that.”198 Thus, unless the
UK is willing (and allowed) to at least partially submit to ECJ jurisdiction,
Brexit will likely result in the UK’s withdrawal from the conventions.199
B. POST-BREXIT SOLUTIONS?
Could the UK reproduce and replace the Brussels and Rome regulations
194
This is for the simple reason that regulations bind EU member states, and not others. When the
UK is no longer subject to the Brussels Regulations, EU law will no longer require automatic recognition
of any civil or commercial judgment issued by a British court, not just those pertaining to schemes of
arrangement. After Brexit, the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation also will no longer bind British courts.
The effect of this on insolvency practice in the UK will be grave, but it may have no effect on recognition
and enforcement of schemes of arrangement since these arrangements sit outside the scope of the EU
Insolvency Regulation. For more extensive discussion of the effects of Brexit on European insolvency practices (distinct from the restructuring or pre-insolvency practices discussed in this article), see Susan BlockLieb, The UK and EU Cross-Border Insolvency Recognition: From Empire to Europe to “Going It Alone,” 40
FORD. J. INT’L L. 1373(2017).
195
See Brussels Convention, supra note 96.
196
See, e.g., Gerard Rothschild, Jurisdiction and Brexit: Back to the Brussels Convention by default?,
BRICK COURT CHAMBERS (July 2016), https://brexit.law/2016/07/08/jurisdiction-and-brexit-back-tothe-brussels-convention-by-default/; Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments Post-Brexit: State of Play,
STIBBE (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.stibbe.com/en/news/2017/march/jurisdiction-and-enforcement-ofjudgments-post-brexit-state-of-play.
197
Gisela Ruehl, Brexit Negotiations Series, ‘The Effect of Brexit on the Resolution of International
Disputes – Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters’, UNIV. OF OXFORD (April 13,
2017), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/04/brexit-negotiations-series-%E2%80%
98-effect-brexit-resolution-international.
198
Personal correspondence with Gabriel Moss QC (on file with the author).
199
Recently, suggestions have emerged to create some other court resembling the European Court of
Justice to which the UK would agree to be bound. Whether this might be accomplished within the
requisite two-year Brexit period, or at all, certainly remains to be seen. See UK Government, Enforcement
and Dispute Resolution: A Future Partnership Paper, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/639609/Enforcement_and_dispute_resolution.pdf.
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or conventions with UK domestic law in a way that preserves its pan-European restructuring practices? Here, there is far less clarity in this possibility.
There is discussion of a Great Repeal Bill, which promises to domesticate EU
law as the law of the United Kingdom with “one simple piece of legislation.”200 Prime Minister Theresa May has remarked that the effect of the
Great Repeal Bill “would mean that the UK is bound, at least on day one, by
the Regulations and the legislation implementing the Directives,”201 but because the Great Repeal Bill could only succeed in binding the UK to EU law
as a matter of its domestic law, this would only be a one-way obligation.
Domestic UK law, no matter how it is phrased, would not bind the other 26
members of the EU to reciprocate.202 The Great Repeal Bill cannot replicate
EU PIL rules such as the Brussels or Rome Regulations.203 That would require international agreement of some sort.
Alternatively, it might be possible for the UK to negotiate one or more
bilateral or multilateral treaties with the member states of the EU, which
would resemble the Brussels and Rome Regulations and extend the application of the EU Insolvency Regulation. The Council of Europe, whose membership is not limited to the EU member states, would be an obvious source
for a multilateral treaty.204 The Hague Conference of Private International
Law is another.205 The Hague Conference has already promulgated one similar treaty on enforceable choice of law clauses and the UK could separately
join in that.206 A broader convention on the recognition and enforcement of
civil and commercial judgments is still being developed at The Hague.207
200
Parliament, United Kingdom, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19. To track progress on
the bill, see http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html.
201
Moss, supra note 198.
202
Id. Thus, as far as cross-border recognition of insolvency proceedings, the effects of the Great
Repeal Bill may not differ much from that of existing British law pertaining to the recognition of nonEuropean insolvency proceedings – namely, the 2006 Insolvency Regulation implementing UNCITRAL’s
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. Section 426 of the 1986 Insolvency Act may provide for greater
cross-border coordination, but mostly as applies to former Commonwealth countries.
203
Nor could it replicate the EU Insolvency Regulation.
204
The Council of Europe was created in the wake of World War II, initially with the goal of reconstructing and reorganizing Europe’s economies but soon became involved in many important aspects of
international law, most notably in human rights. See BIRTE WASSNBERG, HISTORY OF THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE 15 (2013). The Council of Europe is currently comprised of forty-seven countries of Europe,
twenty-eight of which are members of the European Union. Id. at 16. While similar in name, the European
Council is distinct from the Council of Europe, as the European Council sets the European Union’s policy
agenda. See In Focus, The European Council, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/.
205
For discussion of The Hague Conference on Private International Law, see supra note 140.
206
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, Hague Conference on Private International Law, June
30, 2005, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/510bc238-7318-47ed-9ed5-e0972510d98b.pdf. Because the EU is
a party to that treaty, on Brexit, the UK would need separately to accede to the terms of The Hague’s
Choice of Court Convention to remain a party to it.
207
For discussion of work on The Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and
Commercial Judgments, see supra note 140.
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Given how long the Hague Conference has been negotiating these treaties,
however, it would seem foolhardy to presume that negotiations could be concluded in the next two years.
Moreover, no matter the time line, successful negotiation to replicate
these regulations cannot be presumed, even if the desirability of their terms is
accepted on face value. First, as written and conceived, enforcement of these
regulations depends on each member state accepting the jurisdiction of the
CJEU.208 As with the Brussels Convention, the jurisdiction of the CJEU
over disputes under these regulations is both the key to the workings of these
regulations and the single biggest factor militating against comfort that the
UK would agree to be bound to something resembling them post-Brexit. Second, the political situation within Europe may favor second-best solutions in
negotiations with the UK regarding the terms of a Brexit so as to signal to
other member states that exiting the EU comes with substantial costs. This
second-best strategy has been signaled; whether EU diplomats stick to their
guns on this issue is an open question, of course.
In the absence of newly negotiated treaties on PIL, the “effectiveness” of
foreign schemes of arrangement might still be assured as a matter of the domestic PIL law applicable to the affected foreign company and its creditors.209 There is nothing about the jurisprudential requirement of
“effectiveness” that requires reliance on a convention. Indeed, British courts
rely on domestic law when sanctioning foreign schemes of arrangement that
sit outside the scope of EU PIL.210 Reliance on domestic rather than EU
PIL law would complicate enforcement of schemes of arrangement, especially
where the company and its creditors are located in different countries, but it
would not spell the end of foreign scheme of arrangements. Enough money is
at stake with these schemes of arrangement that laborious country-by-country analysis is plausible.
In addition, the UK might look west across the Pond for recognition and
enforcement assistance. US chapter 15 has developed a consistent practice of
recognizing British schemes of arrangement.211 US bankruptcy courts are
likely to continue to recognize schemes of arrangement even after Brexit.
But, depending on the facts of the restructuring, US recognition and enforcement may not, standing alone, be sufficient to assure British courts of the
effectiveness of a foreign scheme of arrangement involving a EU-registered
company.
208
For discussion of the Brussels Regulations, see supra note 102. For discussion of the Rome Regulation, see supra note 115.
209
The reference to the “effectiveness” of foreign schemes of arrangement is intended to point to the
jurisprudential requirements discussed in the text associated with note 93–127, supra.
210
See Payne, supra note 41.
211
See, e.g., Eidenmüller, supra note 78.
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The UK’s previous implementation of UNICITRAL’s Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency (MLCBI) provides little assurance that European
courts would recognize British schemes of arrangement.212 The scope of the
MLCBI is broader than the original EU Insolvency Regulation, in that to
qualify as a foreign proceeding under this Model Law, the proceeding need
only be “pursuant to a law relating to insolvency.” Still, the UK’s implementation of the MLCBI would not resolve questions related to the enforceability of scheme orders against dissenting foreign creditors.213 As with any
other domestic law solutions to the problem of recognition, outbound enforcement cannot be assured. Whether by means of a Great Repeal Bill or
existing UK law providing for recognition of “foreign” insolvency proceedings, British courts could coordinate with and assist incoming insolvency proceedings commenced in Europe and seeking recognition from British courts.
However, these laws would not provide assurance of coordination on outgoing cases that have been commenced in British courts and that seek recognition and enforcement across Europe.
This sort of enforcement assurance would be improved if UNICTRAL’s
MLCBI sweeps across Europe. To date, only a handful of EU member states
have enacted legislation to implement the UNCITRAL texts.214 Some EU
member states have not enacted legislation to implement MLCBI, such as
Germany and Croatia, but nonetheless have adopted domestic rules of insolvency recognition that mimic or exceed the requirements of the UNCITRAL text.215 Others, like France, impose greater formality.216 None of
these domestic PIL rules, however, provide recognition, either automatic or
assured, in the same way as under the Brussels and Rome Regulations.217
Moreover, British case law limits the effect of their Model Law implement212
See Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation 2006, SI 2006 No. 1030, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
uksi/2006/1030/pdfs/uksi_20061030_en.pdf.
213
See, e.g., Graham Bushby & Ian G. Williams, Inside the “Brexit Bubble”: What’s Next for the U.K.?,
XXXV, No. 9 A.B.I. J. (Sept. 1, 2016) (“The EC Reg gives automatic recognition to U.K. insolvency
proceedings throughout the EU, and without access to it, reliance will have to be placed on each member
state’s own laws, as was the case in the past.”). See also Fabio Marelli, What will be the impact of Brexit on
insolvency proceedings?, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7828
bfb8-feaf-4a7e-97cb-cc5664f36e47; Brexit: Restructuring and Insolvency, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILS (Feb.
16, 2017), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/brexit-restructuring-and-insolvency.
214
Putting aside the UK, legislation to implement the MLCBI has been enacted by EU member states:
Greece, Poland, Romania and Slovenia, Montenegro has enacted legislation to implement the MLCBI, but
is still in line to become a member of the EU. For a list of the countries that have enacted legislation to
implement UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html.
215
See, e.g., PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY, at para. 28-067–68
(Sweet & Maxwell ed., 2d ed. 2007).
216
Id. at ¶ 28-066.
217
For a discussion on the exclusion of schemes of arrangement from the original and Recast EU
Insolvency Regulations, see supra text accompanying notes 147 & 180.
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ing legislation (the 2006 Insolvency Regulation) removing any implication for
the recognition and enforcement of insolvency related judgments as applied in
the UK.218 European courts might similarly construe MLCBI. While
UNICTRAL has been at work in patching this hole for several years and
seems poised to promulgate its Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments,219 enactment of legislation to implement this other Model Law across Europe cannot be guaranteed. Such
enactment would take considerable time and, in any event, would not assure
recognition of scheme orders as the proposed Model Law on the InsolvencyRelated Judgments is currently drafted. This most recent UNCITRAL draft
model law might yet be amended to extend to the recognition of scheme
orders, of course; it is not final until UNCITRAL’s governing Commission
says it is final and the General Assembly ratifies their recommendation. And
in any event, implementing countries might tweak the provisions of the
Model Law on Insolvency-Related Judgment to extend to scheme orders.
But the discretion of domestic legislatures to re-work aspects of any model
law in their implementing legislation could work the other way, and ensure
that scheme orders are not covered. UNCITRAL cannot control this aspect
of model laws, which is an attribute considered either to be a bug or a feature
of soft law.
In sum, several paths have emerged. Brexit negotiations might result in a
PIL treaty (or a series of PIL treaties) between EU member states and the
UK replicating those currently in effect. UK Parliament could enact a Great
Repeal Act, which, with a single pen stroke, would replicate the European
law in existence before Brexit as domestic UK law after Brexit. Or the UK
might do neither, leaving existing legislation implementing the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and inviting subsequent implementation of UNCITRAL’s still draft Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments.220
Of these three possibilities, treaties would accomplish the greatest uniformity and predictability, but are notoriously time-consuming to negotiate.
218

Rubin v. Eurofinance SA; New Cap Reinsurance Corp. v. Grant [2012] UKSC 46; [2013] 1 AC

236.
219
See UNCITRAL Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments: Draft Model
Law, UN Doc. No. A/AC.9/WG.V/WP.150 (September 19, 2017), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/UNDOC/LTD/V17/066/58/PDF/V1706658.pdf?OpenElement.
220
The UK enacted their 2006 Insolvency Regulations to implement UNCITRAL’s MLCBI. See
supra note 212. Some EU member states have enacted similar implementing legislation. See supra note
214. Other EU member states might follow this lead and enact something resembling the MLCBI.
Whether any country will enact legislation implementing the draft MLERIRJ is at this point pure speculation, but since the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Ruben, prompted UNCITRAL’s initiative in the first
instance, it would be reasonable to conclude that Parliament may eventually enact at least some aspects of
that model law, as well. See Rubin, supra note 218,
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The hope for multilateral treaties seems to be no more than a moon shot.
Unilateral domestic legislation enacted by Parliament is more achievable, but
would be unlikely to accomplish much in the way of recognition and enforcement of judgments throughout Europe. That leaves reliance on the domestic
PIL rules in individual countries across continental Europe. These might be
sufficient to preserve the forum shopping system currently in place, but domestic PIL varies enormously, even within Europe. Uniformity of result may
be necessary, at least pragmatically, for schemes involving multinational corporations doing business in a number of European countries, but domestic
legislation would not provide that uniformity. Reciprocal enactment by some
or all of such member states of one or both UNCITRAL Model Laws on
these topics might work after Brexit, at least in this context, but it might
takes years for this legislation to be widely enough implemented across Europe. Moreover, domestic PIL legislation, even if patterned after UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, would not involve
automatic recognition of insolvency proceedings, might not extend to the recognition and enforcement of judgments entered in such proceedings, might
not extend to recognition of schemes of arrangement, and, in any event,
would not be subject to enforcement by any transnational court like the
ECJ’s enforcement of the EU Insolvency Regulation and other EU
regulations.
In the meantime, the EU Restructuring Directive might enter into force,
causing members states to enact their own national laws resembling something like the English scheme of arrangement or US chapter 11. In that
event, the UK could lose the substantive law edge on which its forum shopping system depends in the context of schemes of arrangement. With neither
extra-territorial enforcement nor distinct substantive law, all that would remain of this forum shopping system would be ease in gaining access to the
forum, and that might not be enough.
Some would say that this result is not overly problematic, but that depends on whether this has been a good or bad forum shopping. To make this
assessment, I turn to the political economy of foreign schemes of arrangement
in the next section.
IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN SCHEMES OF
ARRANGEMENT
So far, this article has analyzed arguments on whether foreign schemes of
arrangement could and should survive Brexit in terms of arcane issues of PIL
rules – that is, the choice between renegotiation of the treaties and regulations governing recognition of insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings or
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learning to live with purely domestic legislation on this topic.221 In this section I argue, however, that negotiations about the desirability of the persistence of this forum shopping system are not purely legal, and should not be
viewed solely in terms of the law.222 They should be addressed with the
larger forum shopping system in mind.
The forum shopping system for UK centrality in corporate restructuring
practices, at least within Europe, raises several economic issues: some macroeconomic; others more micro-economic in their focus. The macro-economic
justification for recognition of scheme orders starts generally with the case
for recognizing judicial orders entered by national courts within the EU, then
distinguishes orders entered in insolvency and insolvency-related proceedings
from the general case, and concludes by differentiating insolvency from restructuring proceedings, not just on the basis of the type of laws that are
triggered, but also on the source of lending involving. The political economy
of bank lending versus funding provided through the capital markets is contrasted. Competition for trade in legal services is also mentioned.
A. RECOGNITION

AND

JURISDICTION

IN A

“SINGLE MARKET”

Since its inception, the EU has sought to create a “single market” in Europe, which currently is understood to involve not only free trade in goods,
but also free movement in services, capital, and people (the so-called “four
freedoms”). The four freedoms are enabled by assurances set out in EU law –
multilateral treaties binding all EU member states, but also EU regulations
and directives. One such agreement involves “measures relating to judicial
cooperation in civil matters” on the grounds that these measures “are necessary for the sound operation of the internal market.”223 Diplomats have long
understood that if recognition of judgments entered by European courts was
to be automatic throughout Europe, then agreement on the proper basis for
an assertion of authority to enter such a judgment was necessary. Otherwise,
forum shopping would strain commitments to automatic recognition.224
221

For similar arguments, see Block-Lieb, supra note 194.
See, e.g., Brexit: initial considerations in the restructuring and insolvency market, CLIFFORD CHANCE
(July 2016), http://www.lma.eu.com/application/files/2514/6900/7940/Brexit_initialconsiderations_in_
restructuring_and_insolvency_market.pdf (noting that, going forward, “any reasoned analysis for cross border deals will inevitably depend on the outcome of the exit negotiations, which may be swayed by matters
wholly unrelated to insolvency law.”).
223
Brussels I, supra note 102, at Rec. 1. See also Brussels II, supra note 102, at Rec. 3. These Regulations, and the Brussels Convention that preceded them, see supra note 96, are envisioned in the Treaty of
Rome, which initiated the notion of a unified Europe. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community Art. 220, Mar. 25, 1957 (providing that member states “shall, in so far as necessary, engage in
negotiations with each other with a view to ensuring for the benefit of their nationals . . . the simplification
of the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and execution of judicial decisions and of arbitral
awards.”).
224
For one discussion of the debates that preceded finalization of the Brussels Convention, see Kurt H.
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Forum shopping exists where jurisdictional rules are malleable enough
that plaintiffs enjoy choices and where plaintiffs make those choices with
strategic ends in mind.225 The jurisdictional limits set out in the Brussels
Regulations and in the EU Insolvency Regulation (whether in its original
form or recast) were drafted to limit jurisdictional options and to clarify, for
every EU member state, the boundaries of these options. Although crafted in
terms of law, the jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels and Insolvency Regulations are, thus, premised on political agreement on limitations pertaining to
economic incentives ever-present in litigation and litigation strategy.226 Recitals in both expressly warn against forum shopping as contrary to the “mutual trust” on which European Union is premised.227
Cross-border recognition of judgments, and of insolvency and restructuring practices, has long been identified as critically important to the development of a single economic market within Europe. But the shift toward a
financial market economy within Europe put pressure on cross-border recognition and enforcement within the EU.
B. RECOGNITION ACROSS NATIONAL BORDERS: THE BANKCENTERED STORY
Recognition of civil judgments and recognition of insolvency proceedings
are both important to the creation and maintenance of a “single market”
within Europe, but recently the recognition of insolvency proceedings has
taken on an additional significance. The global financial crisis that commenced
in 2008, and that we hope finally to have seen the last of, reinforced for many
the connections between insolvency and restructuring law and policy, on one
hand, and the prevention and resolution of financial crises, on the other.
It is now widely agreed that modern corporate insolvency laws assist in
Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market
Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (1967). The economic and political union of interests represented by the
single European market is premised on “mutual trust,” but this is a trust that gets verified in multiple
ways. In the Brussels Convention, “mutual trust” was coupled with an agreement on the jurisdictional
limits of judgments subject to such recognition and enforcement. Id. at 998 (distinguishing between a
simple “recognition” treaty and a “double convention” joining agreement on recognition with agreement on
jurisdictional limits on the judgments entitled to recognition). The so-called “insolvency carve-out” from
the initial Brussels Convention (which persists in the Brussels Regulations that followed) was premised,
not on the unimportance of insolvency laws to the existence of a single market, but rather on the difficulties of articulating the distinct jurisdictional agreements that would be needed in any European convention
on the cross-border recognition of insolvency proceedings. See EU Insolvency Reg, supra note 14, at Rec.
16; see also IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW at 10 (Oxford Univ. Press
ed., 1999).
225
See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 55.
226
The political economy of combining jurisdictional rules with agreement on recognition and enforcement of judgments is longstanding and not unique to Europe. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 224 (“All
legal systems endeavor to protect defendants from suit at an improper forum.”).
227
See supra note 224.
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resolving financial crises because they assist in resolving non-performing corporate loans. In part, this is because cleaning up corporate balance sheets
helps in turn to clean up bank balance sheets.228 This economic argument has
been accepted by the G-22,229 all the international financial institutions (including both the IMF230 and World Bank231), and lawmaking international
organizations (such as UNICTRAL).232 The EU has also adopted this argument in revising their Insolvency Regulation,233 and proposing to adopt the
Directive on Restructuring Frameworks.234
Although European law draws a clear line between recognition of insolvency proceedings, on one hand, and restructuring agreements, on the other,
the economic justification for their cross-border recognition is fully in alignment. There is wide acceptance of the policy claim that corporate restructuring arrangements help prevent and resolve financial crises as much as
corporate insolvency laws aimed at reorganization.235 Indeed, the proposed
EU Directive on Restructuring Frameworks accepts the policy importance of
enabling pre-insolvency proceedings and contractual restructuring of financial
arrangements at risk of default and, if finalized and implemented, would move
Europe closer to convergence on this topic.236
228
See, e.g., BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS, supra note 189; Susan Block-Lieb &
Terence C. Halliday, The Macropolitics and Microeconomics of Global Financial Crises: Bankruptcy as a
Point of Reference (forthcoming in SOVEREIGN INSOLVENCY: POSSIBLE LEGAL SOLUTIONS (Jasna Garasic &
Nadia Bodiroga-Vukobrat eds.) (accepted for publication in Springer Press)).
229
G-22, Report of the Working Group on Strengthening Financial Systems (Oct. 1998), https://
www.imf.org/external/np/g22/sfsrep.pdf.
230
IMF, Comments on the Reports on the International Financial Architecture (Aug. 1999), http://
www.imf.org/external/np/g22/comments/.
231
World Bank, Staff Information Note, International Financial Architecture: An Update on World
Bank Activities (April 27, 2001), http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/IFARPT4_01-1.pdf.
232
UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf.
233
European Commission, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, COM(2012) 744 final 2012/0360 (COD), at 3 (Dec. 12, 2012)(“The overall objective of the revision
of the Insolvency Regulation is to improve the efficiency of the European framework for resolving crossborder insolvency cases in view of ensuring a smooth functioning of the internal market and its resilience
in economic crises.”), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency-regulation_en.pdf.
234
European Commission, Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to
increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/
30/EU, COM(2016) 723 final, 2016/0359 (COD), at 5 (Nov. 22, 2016) (“Measures to increase the
effectiveness of restructuring, insolvency and second chance frameworks would contribute to efficient
management of defaulting loans and reduce accumulation of non-performing loans on bank balance sheets.”),
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-48/proposal_40046.pdf.
235
See, e.g., Garrido, supra note 65; Thomas Laryea, IMF Staff Position Note, Approaches to Corporate Debt Restructuring in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, SPN/10/02 (Jan. 26, 2010).
236
EU Restructuring Directive, supra note 59. Moreover, initial commentary on the proposed EU
Directive is that it isn’t flexible enough and doesn’t go far enough. See, e.g., Eidenmüller, supra note 191.

R

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ABK\92-1\ABK101.txt

2018)

unknown

Seq: 45

17-NOV-17

REACHING TO RESTRUCTURE ACROSS BORDERS

10:12

45

The bank-centered explanation for the importance of restructuring and
schemes of arrangement, including foreign schemes of arrangement, has taken
on an outsized significance precisely because London has historically held a
position of economic strength in the financial markets, both within Europe
and globally. But banks’ position at the center of financial markets has shifted
of late. Since the global financial crisis hit, proportionately less of the commercial debt taken on by companies has been “bank debt” – that is, debt lent
by banks.237 The global financial crisis triggered a liquidity crisis, bank lending sunk to historic lows, and commercial borrowers learned that they could
obtain access to needed funds via the issuance of bonds in the capital markets.238 Even after this liquidity crisis was resolved, the capital markets continued to grow in commercial lending markets.239
The bank-centered justification for cross-border recognition insolvency
proceedings and court-facilitated restructuring has not completely dissipated.
But it has of late been supplemented by arguments now focused more directly
on the importance of such recognition to bond-led capital markets (as distinct
from bank-led financial markets).240
C. RECOGNITION ACROSS NATIONAL BORDERS: THE CAPITALMARKETS STORY
London has been called Europe’s investment banker, and for good reason:
over the past several decades, half of the equity and debt raised by Eurozone
firms was issued “in the UK, by firms based in the UK, quite often to invesOn the other side, some German professionals have voiced their preference that the Bundestag consider
enacting legislation that would enable an English-style scheme of arrangement. Isabel Giancristofano &
Thomas Hoffman, Scheme of Arrangement: Are hurdles for restructuring German companies getting higher?,
NOERR (March 1, 2016), https://www.noerr.com/en/newsroom/News/scheme-of-arrangement-are-hurdles-for-restructuring-german-companies-getting-higher.aspx (noting that “the German Registered Association of Insolvency Administrators (VID) has submitted a proposal for implementing such a restructuring
procedure in addition to the regular insolvency proceedings in Germany.”).
237
For discussion of the immediate effects of the global financial crisis on bank lending and bond debt
issued to corporate borrowers, see, e.g., Daniel Carvalho, Miguel A. Ferreira & Pedro Matos, Lending
Relationships and the Effect of Bank Distress: Evidence from the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis, 50 J. FIN. &
QUANT. ANAL. 1165 (Dec. 2015) (studying 1,564 publicly traded firms from 34 countries and concluding
that bond debt issuances increased in 2007-09 but did not equal reduction in bank debt during that
period).
238
For industry assessment of the importance of capital market lending in the wake of the financial
crisis, see Economic Importance of the Corporate Bond Markets, INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASSOC. (March
2013), file:///Users/sblocklieb/Downloads/Corporate%20Bond%20Markets%20March%202013%20(2)
.pdf.
239
See Andrew Bolger, Debt Issued by European Countries Heads for Post-Crisis High, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/cfd9d3b0-70d5-11e4-8113-00144feabdc0 (“Bonds
have taken a rising share of corporate debt since the global financial crisis, now accounting for an average
83 per cent of the total debt of European corporates in developed markets.”).
240
See, e.g., Gerald McCormack, Business Restructuring Law in Europe: Making a Fresh Start, 17 J.
CORP. L STUD. 167 (2017).
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tors in the UK.”241 Before the global financial crisis, continental European
corporations often borrowed through a mix of bank-lent debt and publiclyoffered debt in the form of bonds, but the liquidity and sovereign debt crises
that followed prompted a shift toward bond debt, with a sizeable portion of
this bond debt represented by high-yield bonds.242 Between 2008 and 2013,
European companies’ high-yield bond debt more than trebled: bond debt issued out of London to EU companies and sold to capital markets throughout
Europe, not just the UK.243
As continental EU companies defaulted on this high-risk London-issued
bond debt, they faced a bind. On one hand, continental European insolvency
laws were mostly ill-suited to allowing the restructuring of purely financial
difficulties. Some of these laws still do not look to facilitate corporate reorganization. To the extent that the law is reorganization friendly, the reorganization process may be time consuming and costly. Companies nearing default
often feared that accessing continental insolvency proceedings would result in
an enormous loss in value and possibly even liquidation. On the other hand,
success in restructuring bond debt is mercurial. In the past, a restructuring of
English-issued corporate debt might have been viewed as plausible, especially
where London banks were the lenders.244 Bond debt is far more difficult to
restructure than bank debt. A purely contractual workout of a troubled
bond issuance is far more difficult because unanimous or near-unanimous
agreement to the terms of the restructuring agreement may be required.245
Thus, while voluntary restructuring might have been reached if the European
241
The phrase was first coined by Mark Carney, Chairman of the Bank of England. Chris Giles,
‘Carney warns EU over “crucial” City’, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov, 30, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/
e2d4801c-b72a-11e6-ba85-95d1533d9a62.
242
See Bolger, supra note 232 (“Bonds have taken a rising share of corporate debt since the global
financial crisis, now accounting for an average 83 per cent of the total debt of European corporates in
developed markets.”).
243
See William Needham & Daniel Bayfield, A Tide of High Yield Restructurings, SOUTH SQUARE
DIGEST, at 68 (May 2014), http://www.insol.org/emailer/May_2014_downloads/A%20tide%20of%20
high%20yield%20restructurings_South%20Square.pdf (noting that in 2008 there were fewer than 40 European high-yield bond issuances totaling =
C 32, but that by 2013 there were more than 255 issuances
worth =
C 117).
244
Pen Kent, The London Approach, BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. 110 (Feb. 1993). http://www
.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/qb/1993/qb93q1110115.pdf. See also INSOL International, Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts (2000), https://
www.insol.org/pdf/Lenders.pdf.
245
Under the US Trust Indenture Act, unanimous agreement is required for amendment to an indenture’s “core payment terms.” See, e.g., Marblegate Asset Mgmt. v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., No. 15-2124-cv(L),
15-2141-cv (CON) (2d Cir. Jan. 17, 2017); see also Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The
Trade-Off Between Individual and Collective Rights, 77 NYU L. REV. 1040 (2002). In Europe, indenture
payment terms often can be amended with 90-95 percent consent, although even this bar for revision to
the terms of an indenture is likely to create opportunities for some to “hold out.” Marblegate: What Does
It Mean for European Restructurings?, Lexology (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8daefab3-044e-43ba-92d3-5713a92137d3.
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company had borrowed from a small syndicate of bank lenders, unanimous or
near-unanimous agreement among numerous bondholders was more likely to
have prompted holdouts, precluding the necessary agreement.
Schemes of arrangement are designed to thwart incentives to hold out;
dissenters are bound to the deal approved by a super-majority of the affected
bondholders. However, dissenters are protected in the process by binding
them only where their dissent represents less than 25 percent in the overall
value of the affected debt. Schemes of arrangement are unique to England,
however; no continental European country has enacted similar legislation, at
least to date.246
English schemes of arrangement present a way out for financially distressed European companies’ bond debt, but only if (i) British courts authorize these schemes, and (ii) European and other courts recognize and enforce
the scheme orders against dissenting bondholders’ objections. For example, a
company with a high-yield bond debt containing a NY choice of law clause in
the indenture, might also need to show that the scheme was likely to be
recognized under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Convincing all
these courts to go along with the foreign schemes of arrangement is complicated both by the issuing company’s non-UK COMI and, in many cases, by
choice of law clauses choosing New York (rather than English) law.247 Depending on the facts of the case, these complications often have been met by
shifts in the company’s COMI or creditor agreement to new choice of law
clauses.248
Given increasing reliance on high-yield bond debt by continental European companies, recognition of schemes of arrangement, including foreign
schemes of arrangement, has grown in importance. EU-COMI-ed companies
have sought to confirm English schemes of arrangement because they have
few viable alternatives. European restructuring is unlikely to receive the requisite consensus; European insolvency laws generally are insufficiently nimble
to enable a timely financial rescue. To avoid default and subsequent liquidation, these European companies, with the advice of counsel, have done what
they needed to do in order to gain access to English courts, sometimes shift246

See supra note 236.
Data on the extent to which European companies bond debt is governed by English, New York or
some other law is generally only available on a fee-paid basis and, thus, difficult to access and to analyze
critically. For the assertion that approximately 86 percent of European high-yield bond issuances are
governed by New York law, see Andrew Wilkinson, Alexander Wood, Patrick Bright, Nitin Konchady &
Kate Stephenson, Marblegate: What Does it Mean for European Restructurings?, GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING REV. 58, 59 (May 2017) (citing data and analysis conducted by Xtract Research).
248
In Codere, for example, the financing subsidiary’s COMI was shifted from Lichtenstein to England.
The NY choice of law clause was left in place in the indenture; the company demonstrated sufficient
connections to England and Wales by pointing to the company’s new English COMI and to the English
choice of law clause in the governing inter-creditor agreement. See supra text accompanying notes 42–47.
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ing their COMIs to England, sometimes changing the law governing their
indenture or guarantee or inter-company debt agreements to English law.
They were forum shopping. So far courts have viewed these shifts as “good”
forum shopping, and as a result, established a forum shopping system to protect against substantial loss in value. But that tolerance may not last.
D. PROFESSIONAL INFLUENCE
Another economic factor of relevance to the continuation of the forum
shopping system centered on schemes of arrangement is the influence of financial service professionals. Much of the high yield bond debt issued to European companies in the last 10 to 12 years has been issued out of London.249
EU regulation of financial and capital markets has facilitated London’s centrality in this lending.250 This London-based bond lending has benefitted
London-based financial and capital markets. Important beneficiaries of this
lending have been London-based financial service professionals.
Elite investment banks have profited from combining the benefits of these
EU regulations with broad financial services experience in London-based investment banks. So, too, have global London law firms – the so-called Magic
Circle.251 These service providers would benefit from the perpetuation of
the forum shopping system in foreign schemes of arrangement.
Distressed-debt servicing out of London has been facilitated both because
foreign schemes of arrangement have sought to maximize bondholders’ returns, rather than evade their repayment, and because the economics of global
restructuring practice does not offer London a monopoly. New York law
firms share in the benefits of this practice, especially where cross-border recognition of the scheme of arrangement is required in US markets.252 Singapore firms are also looking to increase their share of this business.253 Law
firms in other European locations are increasingly loud in their claims to compete for this restructuring practice.254 So far however, London law firms have
enjoyed an important advantage in their ability to craft schemes of arrange249
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ment that both enjoy the approval of a company’s creditors and of English
courts, and London has looked to keep this advantage.
Two distinct threats could unsettle the advantages enjoyed by the Magic
Circle firms. Only one of these is Brexit.
First, recent revisions to the EU Insolvency Regulation may pose some
threat to English domination of European restructuring practices. Although
schemes of arrangement continue to sit outside the Recast EU Insolvency
Regulation,255 the question of whether scheme orders should be subject to
automatic recognition and enforcement under either the Brussels or Rome
Regulation was not resolved by revisions to the EU Insolvency Regulation.
The Recast EU Insolvency Regulation is not completely neutral on the question of recognition in that its Recitals include an express note of caution to
litigants: there might well be a gap between the Insolvency and Judgments
Regulation; mind the gap!256
Brexit poses a second and graver threat to foreign schemes of arrangement
practices. As Brexit is negotiated over the next months, the politics of the
enforcement of foreign schemes of arrangement will require a weighing of
competing economic interests: On one hand, foreign schemes of arrangement
emanating out of British courts benefit European balance sheets (the balance
sheet of European companies, their stakeholders, including the banks and capital markets that have extended credit to these European companies); on the
other hand, recognition of UK foreign schemes of arrangement favor restructuring practitioners and other professionals in financial services markets in
London over lawyers and investment bankers located elsewhere in Europe,
although perhaps only in the short term.257 As the EU Restructuring Directive is implemented in emerging financial centers like Frankfurt, and Paris,
and even Dublin, German and French and Irish lawyers might benefit from
the new corporate rescue practice that will emerge. This implementation
will be affected, inevitably, by negotiations over other EU regulations governing passporting and other regulations governing the single European financial and capital markets.258
Some argue that Brexit will not affect London’s important financial services industries (or at least not by very much).259 It is undoubtedly right to
note that London’s centrality in existing financial and capital markets has
255
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benefited both the UK and continental Europe and that a hard Brexit would
be economically detrimental for both the UK and the other EU member
states. The likely negative implications of a hard Brexit for English financial
service industries explain much about continued political wrangling inside
Mrs. May’s cabinet. It should come as no surprise that Philip Hammond, the
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, has advocated a “soft” Brexit, which would
include the development of some sort of submission by the UK to something
resembling the CJEU.260 An agreement by the United Kingdom to be bound
by a European court of some sort would be a necessary ingredient to salvaging the Brussels and Rome (and other) Regulations. A recent UK Government White Paper suggests increasingly flexible thinking on this issue.261
The issuance of this White Paper is, alone, no indication that agreement will
be reached in Brexit negotiations; nonetheless, remaining bound to these regulations and establishing some measure for their post-Brexit enforcement may
be sufficient to quell threats to the “single” EU financial and capital
markets.262
All of this is to say that preservation of the existing practices associated
with English courts’ willingness to sanction requests for a foreign scheme of
arrangement, and European courts’ willingness to recognize and enforce these
English scheme orders, represent a sort of canary in the coal mines. Like sootfilled coal mines, Brexit negotiations threaten to suffocate the many economic
gains accomplished in the EU’s financials services markets to date. If foreign
schemes of arrangement survive Brexit intact, it will be because UK and
other EU diplomats have determined that London should remain Europe’s
financial center even after Brexit. Preservation of London as the world’s second most important financial center (after New York) is unquestionably an
economically sound choice for Europe.263 A hard Brexit from existing financial and capital markets in Europe would harm both the UK and Europe.264
Rather than look to knock down London’s involvement in post-Brexit finanRESEARCH PAPER No. 10/2017 (April 21, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
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cial services, including its restructuring practices, the EU and UK could
work together on an economically sensible Brexit that, despite this exit,
builds on the “mutual trust” on which the EU is premised. But they might
not: politically, a soft Brexit from financial services markets may involve a
series of hard sells on the Continent.
CONCLUSION
Recent economic events have created pressure to reorganize failing companies and restructure their defaulting debt obligations through the use of
rapidly changing European PIL rules. Bound both to fiduciary obligations to
shareholders and jurisdictional limits set out in international instruments,
floundering companies and their insolvency professionals seek to construe
these rules in ways most likely to result in the company’s survival and its
stakeholders’ satisfaction. In some instances, they have looked creatively to
access regulations and venues that would otherwise have been unavailable in
the absence of this proactive and inventive conduct. This conduct might be
characterized as forum shopping, given the fact shifting they engaged in just
prior to the remedies they sought. But given the beneficial effects of the
forum shopping, not everyone has referred to these corporate migrations as
misconduct. Moreover, CJEU case law supports the notion that COMIshifting should sometimes be viewed as “good forum shopping.” Even given
this support, not all venue selection decisionmaking may get recognized, enforced, and forgiven. Practitioners, courts, and commentators have struggled
to redefine forum shopping to allow for the possibility of “good forum shopping” that benefitted most if not all stake holders in an effort to rescue financial struggling companies situated in financially struggling economies,
especially where creditor consent was coupled with transparency. The EU
reached a tentative agreement on the line between good and bad forum shopping, but this resolution has been shaken by negotiations on the terms of
Brexit.
Although foreign schemes of arrangement have assisted in preserving EU
financial services markets and in resolving EU companies’ balance sheets in
the wake of global financial crisis, Brexit may well alter assessment of them as
“good forum shopping” that should be preserved. The post-Brexit treatment
of schemes of arrangement, especially the recognition by European courts of
foreign schemes sanctioned by British courts, will depend on resolving questions that are not wholly legal. The trick will be to convince politicians and
policymakers to focus more on economics than emotion, and decide how best
to retain enough of the good forum shopping system in this context to preserve corporate restructuring practices in a world apparently hell-bent on
rejecting globalization.
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